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A Proposal for a National Mortgage 
Registry: 
MERS Done Right 
Dale A. Whitman* 
Abstract: In this Article, Professor Whitman analyzes the existing legal 
regime for transfers of notes and mortgages on the secondary market, and 
concludes that it is highly inconvenient and dysfunctional, with the result that 
large numbers of market participants simply did not observe its rules during 
the huge market run-up of the early and mid-2000s.  He also considers Mort-
gage Electronic Registration System (MERS), which was designed to allevi-
ate the inconveniences of repeatedly recording mortgage assignments, but 
concludes that it was conceptually flawed and has proven to be an inadequate 
response to the problem.  For these reasons the legal system was ill-prepared 
for the avalanche of foreclosures that followed the collapse of the mortgage 
market in 2007, and continues to be beset by litigation and uncertainty.  This 
Article then provides a conceptual outline for an alternative National Mort-
gage Registry, which would supplant the present legal system and would 
provide convenience, transparency, and efficiency for all market participants.  
He concludes with a draft of a statute that could be enacted by Congress to 
create such a registry. 
CONTENTS 
I.  THE TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE TRANSFER PROCESS 
 A.  Apparent Separation of Note and Mortgage 
 B.  The Uses of Recorded Mortgage Assignments 
  1.  Prevention of Fraud by the Transferor 
  
 * Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Missouri-Columbia.  This Article 
was prepared while I was Visiting Professor of Law, University of Georgia. I express 
appreciation for their review of earlier drafts of this paper to Wilson Freyermuth, 
Grant Nelson, Thomas A. Cox, Bill Beckmann, Barry Nekritz, John Valdivielso, 
James Newell, and Joyce Palomar.  Any errors are mine alone, of course. 
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  2.  Assurance of Receiving Notice of Legal Proceedings 
  3.  Recordation of Assignments as a Practical Necessity for Future Title  
 Examiners 
  4.  Recordation of Assignments as a Statutory Prerequisite to  
 Foreclosure 
  5.  Conclusion: What are Assignments Worth? 
 C.  Transfer of the Note 
 D.  The Cost of Following the Rules 
II.  THE ADVENT AND FALLACIES OF MERS 
 A.  A Weak Legal Foundation 
 B.  Separation of Mortgage from Note 
 C.  Use of Multiple “Corporate Officers” 
 D.  Foreclosure in the Name of MERS  
 E.  Transparency 
 F.  Loan Tracking Accuracy 
III.  FEATURES OF A NATIONAL MORTGAGE LOAN REGISTRY 
 A.  Federal Preemption 
 B.  What is Being Registered? 
 C.  Initial Recording of Mortgages 
 D.  Registration or Recording? 
 E.  Electronic Registration and Transfer and the Problem Of Document  
Authenticity 
 F.  Registration of Servicing 
 G.  Capturing the Entire Loan File 
 H.  Transparency 
 I.  Fees 
 J.  Notice of Registered Information 
 K.  A Bureaucratic Home 
 L.  The Holder in Due Course Doctrine 
 M.  Constitutionality 
IV.  CONCLUSION. 





The law of the United States governing transfers of mortgages on the 
secondary market and foreclosures by secondary market investors is in a dis-
mal state.  In this Article I propose to explore those deficiencies and to pre-
sent a proposal for an alternate legal regime that I believe would be far more 
functional and efficient. 
The need for such a system – a nationwide registry of mortgage owner-
ship – has already been recognized.  In its recent white paper, “The U.S. 
Housing Market: Current Conditions and Policy Considerations,” the Federal 
Reserve Board commented: 
2
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A final potential area for improvement in mortgage servicing 
would involve creating an online registry of liens.  Among other 
problems, the current system for lien registration in many jurisdic-
tions is antiquated, largely manual, and not reliably available in 
cross-jurisdictional form.  Jurisdictions do not record liens in a 
consistent manner, and moreover, not all lien holders are required 
to register their liens.  This lack of organization has made it diffi-
cult for regulators and policymakers to assess and address the is-
sues raised by junior lien holders when a senior mortgage is being 
considered for modification.  Requiring all holders of loans backed 
by residential real estate to register with a national lien registry 
would mitigate this information gap and would allow regulators, 
policymakers, and market participants to construct a more compre-
hensive picture of housing debt.1 
Section I of this Article will discuss the traditional methods by which 
mortgages were traded on the secondary market in the United States prior to 
the mid-1990s and will attempt to illuminate why participants in the market 
found these methods lacking and generally discontinued using them.  Section 
II will explain why and how MERS was set up in the mid-1990s and why it 
  
 1. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET: 
CURRENT CONDITIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 24-25 (2012).  The Board fur-
ther commented, 
The national lien registry could also record the 
name of the servicer.  Currently, parties with a 
legitimate interest in contacting the servicer 
have little to go on from the land records be-
cause, among other reasons, many liens have 
been recorded only in the name of the trustee 
or of Mortgage Electronic Registration Sys-
tems (MERS).  Registering the servicer, and 
updating the information when servicing is 
transferred, could help local governments and 
nonprofits, for example, who might be work-
ing to resolve the status of vacant or aban-
doned properties. 
Id. at 25.  Other commentators recommending creation of such a system include FED. 
HOUSING FIN. AGENCY, A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR ENTERPRISE CONSERVATORSHIPS: 
THE NEXT CHAPTER IN A STORY THAT NEEDS AN ENDING 13 (2012) (“A sound, effi-
cient system for document custody and electronic registration of mortgages, notes, 
titles, and liens that respects local property laws but also enhances the liquidity of 
mortgages so that borrowers may benefit from a liquid secondary market for buying 
and selling mortgages.”; Tanya Marsh, Foreclosures and the Failure of the American 
Land Title Recording System, 111 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 19, 25 (2011), available 
at http://www.columbialawreview.org/articles/foreclosures-and-the-failure-of-
the-american-land-title-recording-system  (recommending the creation of such a 
system). 
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has largely failed to achieve the purposes which many envisioned for it.  Sec-
tion III will present an alternative to MERS – one that would not suffer from 
its deficiencies, and would achieve the results MERS could not accomplish.  
It will analyze the policy and legal questions that must be answered in creat-
ing such a new system.  Finally, an appendix to this article will provide a 
draft of a statute that would create such a new system. 
I.  THE TRADITIONAL MORTGAGE TRANSFER PROCESS 
Mortgage borrowers in the United States are nearly always asked to sign 
two documents, one of them an evidence of the obligation to repay the debt, 
and the other a security agreement encumbering the real estate.  In former 
times, a bond was sometimes used as the debt instrument, but today a promis-
sory note is virtually always employed.2  The security instrument may be a 
mortgage, a deed of trust, or (in Georgia) a security deed.  While these differ-
ent names for security instruments may portend differences in foreclosure 
procedure, for most purposes of mortgage law they are treated as identical. 
A.  Separation of Note and Mortgage 
Borrowers probably wonder why two documents are used instead of 
one.  Why are the note and the mortgage not combined into a single docu-
ment, as is usually done with consumer credit contracts?  The reason is partly 
tradition, and perhaps partly that the drafter wished to make the note negotia-
ble in order to take advantage of the Holder in Due Course doctrine (which 
permits the holder of the note to take free of many defenses that the maker 
might raise), and could not accomplish this negotiability if the terms of the 
mortgage were incorporated into the note.3  Therefore, modern practice is to 
  
 2. The distinction between bonds and notes is largely formalistic: bonds are 
traditionally issued in a series (rather than as a single document), are executed with a 
seal, and are nonnegotiable.  FREDRICK A. CLEVELAND, FUNDS AND THEIR USES 182 
(Henry B. Hall ed., revised ed. 1922).  In modern practice, bonds are almost never 
employed to evidence loans to individuals. 
 3. All references to Article 3 of the U.C.C. are to the 1990 version (the most 
recent broad-scale revision) unless otherwise noted.  Under U.C.C. § 3-104(a)(3), a 
note is negotiable only if it “does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the 
person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of 
money.”  There are exceptions – that is, certain other promises that may be included, 
but the incorporation of the full terms of the typical mortgage into the note would 
almost certainly destroy its negotiability.  See Dale A. Whitman, How Negotiability 
Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage Market, and What to Do About It, 37 PEPP. 
L. REV. 737, 747-48 (2010) [hereinafter Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up 
the Secondary Mortgage Market].  The historical development of the concept of nego-
tiability and the rationale for keeping the note and mortgage separate are nicely sum-
marized in Mark B. Greenlee & Thomas J. Fitzpatrick IV, Reconsidering the Applica-
tion of the Holder in Due Course Rule to Home Mortgage Notes (Fed. Reserve Bank 
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have two separate documents,4 though on rare occasions in the past the two 
were incorporated together.5  
However, the use of two documents raises a troublesome prospect: that 
they could be transferred to two different parties.  As we will see, the courts 
labor diligently to prevent this result from occurring unless it is very clearly 
the intention of the transferor, and for good reason.  If a legal separation of 
the note and mortgage occurs, the Comment in the Mortgages Restatement 
explains the results as follows: 
[S]eparating the obligation from the mortgage results in a practical 
loss of efficacy of the mortgage . . . .  When the right of enforce-
ment of the note and the mortgage are split, the note becomes, as a 
practical matter, unsecured.  This result is economically wasteful 
and confers an unwarranted windfall on the mortgagor.   
It is conceivable that on rare occasions a mortgagee will wish to 
disassociate the obligation and the mortgage, but that result should 
follow only upon evidence that the parties to the transfer so agreed.  
The far more common intent is to keep the two rights combined.  
Ideally a transferring mortgagee will make that intent plain by exe-
cuting to the transferee both an assignment of the mortgage and an 
assignment, indorsement, or other appropriate transfer of the obli-
gation.  But experience suggests that, with fair frequency, mortga-
gees fail to document their transfers so carefully.  This section’s 
purpose is generally to achieve the same result even if one of the 
two aspects of the transfer is omitted.6 
  
of Cleveland, Working Paper No. 08-08, 2008), available at 
http://www.clevelandfed.org/reserach/workpaper/2008/wp0808.pdf.   
 4. Keeping the note and mortgage separate has, at least theoretically, some 
additional advantages.  A single mortgage can secure more than one note, and if sev-
eral notes are employed, they can subsequently be sold to different investors or “par-
ticipants,” while continuing to be secured in the aggregate by a single lien on the real 
estate.  But again, this is not a common modern practice.  See GRANT S. NELSON & 
DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 5.35 (5th ed. 2007) (discussing 
mortgage loan participations). 
 5. See CLEVELAND, supra note 2, at 165 (indicating that the practice of combin-
ing the two documents was not common in 1921). 
 6. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 5.4 cmt. a (1997).  The 
Comment suggests only one situation in which a mortgagee might wish to separate 
ownership of the note from the mortgage: a case in which the mortgagee wishes to 
bifurcate the obligation (or in which it is already bifurcated by virtue of being repre-
sented by two or more notes), and the mortgagee wishes to transfer part of the obliga-
tion while at the same time making it unsecured, while keeping the entire security for 
himself.  See id.  This is, of course, a very rare sort of transaction, and has nothing in 
common with ordinary residential mortgage finance.  Id.  It is also conceivable that in 
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Not only does the note become unsecured if the note and mortgage are 
separated, but “[t]he mortgage becomes useless in the hands of one who does 
not also hold the obligation because only the holder of the obligation can 
foreclose.”7  This outcome follows from the universally-agreed principle that 
“a mortgage may be enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is enti-
tled to enforce the obligation the mortgage secures.”8  It is apparent that any 
situation that results in the holding of the note and mortgage by two inde-
pendent parties is likely to prove bitterly frustrating to both of them – one 
because his or her obligation has become unsecured, and the other because 
she or he holds a mortgage that can never be foreclosed. 
To accomplish what is nearly always the intended purpose of the parties, 
the Restatement thus provides that “[a] transfer of an obligation secured by a 
mortgage also transfers the mortgage unless the parties to the transfer agree 
otherwise.”9  The common way of expressing this principle is to say, “the 
mortgage follows the note.”10  Hence, a transfer of the note will transfer the 
mortgage with it automatically in the absence of a contrary agreement.  On 
this point the Restatement is supported by a host of authority,11 much of it 
  
rare cases in which the land has become undesirable as security, as when it is con-
taminated with hazardous waste, the holder of the note and mortgage will intention-
ally release the mortgage but retain and enforce the note. 
 7. Id. § 5.4 reporters’ note, intro. cmt. a (citing In re Atlantic Mortg. Corp., 69 
B.R. 321 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1987); Swinton v. Cuffman, 213 S.W. 409 (Ark. 1919); 
Stribling v. Splint Coal Co., 5 S.E. 321 (W. Va. 1888)).  The sort of separation dis-
cussed here is a legal, not a physical separation.  Physical separation is common; for 
example, the note may be held by a custodian for a secondary market investor, while 
the mortgage and assignments of the mortgage may be held in the investor’s files.  No 
particular legal consequences arise from such a physical separation, and there is no 
requirement that the note and mortgage be kept physically together. 
 8. Id. § 5.4(c); see also Multicircuits, Inc. v. Grunsted, 809 N.W.2d 900 (Wis. 
Ct. App. 2012) (per curiam) (finding that when a mortgage was assigned without 
transfer of note, that mortgage became unenforceable). 
 9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 5.4(a). 
 10. See, e.g., CPT Asset Backed Certificates, Series 2004-EC1 v. Cin Kham, 278 
P.3d 586, 589 (Okla. 2012). 
 11. Horvath v. Bank of N.Y., 641 F.3d 617, 623 (4th Cir. 2011) (“a transfer of a 
secured debt carries with it the security without formal assignment or delivery”); 
Bryant v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc. (In re Bryant), 452 B.R. 876, 880 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ga. 2011) (under South Carolina law “the assignment of a note secured by a mortgage 
carries with it an assignment of the mortgage” (citing Midfirst Bank, SSB v. C.W. 
Haynes & Co., Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1304, 1318 (D.S.C. 1994))); Unsecured Creditors’ 
Comm. v. Shawmut Worcester Cnty. Bank (In re Ivy Properties, Inc.), 109 B.R. 10, 
14 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); In re Union Packing Co., 62 B.R. 96, 100 (Bankr. D. Neb. 
1986); First Nat’l Bank v. Larson (In re Kennedy Mortg. Co.), 17 B.R. 957, 965 
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1982); Rodney v. Ariz. Bank, 836 P.2d 434, 436 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1992); Campbell v. Warren, 726 P.2d 623, 625 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (holding an 
assignment of a portion of the payments from a promissory note automatically trans-
fers a pro tanto interest in the mortgage that secures the note); Domarad v. Fisher & 
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taking an even stronger position: that it is legally impossible to separate the 
mortgage from the note, even by means of a contrary agreement.12 
Suppose a mortgagee creates a situation in which holding of the note 
and mortgage seem to be bifurcated, by transferring the note to another but 
carelessly or malevolently retaining the mortgage or transferring it to a sepa-
rate and independent party.  What could the holder of the note do about it?  If 
the holder of the mortgage refused to assign the mortgage to the noteholder 
voluntarily, the noteholder could bring an action in equity to compel such an 
  
Burke, Inc., 76 Cal. Rptr. 529, 535-36 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); Margiewicz v. Terco 
Props., 441 So. 2d 1124, 1125 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Moore v. Lewis, 366 
N.E.2d 594, 599 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Jones v. Titus, 175 N.W. 257, 259 (Mich. 
1919); Goetz v. Selsor, 628 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Mo. App. S.D. 1982); Deutsche Bank 
Trust Co. Ams. v. Codio, 943 N.Y.S.2d 545, 546 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (“‘[A] writ-
ten assignment of the underlying note . . . is sufficient to transfer the obligation, and 
the mortgage passes with the debt as an inseparable incident”’ (quoting Bank of N.Y. 
v. Silverberg, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532, 538 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011))); Deutsche Bank Nat’l 
Trust Co. v. Pietranico, 928 N.Y.S.2d 818, 829 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (“[A]s the note 
changes hands, the mortgage remains connected to it legally even though it is not 
physically attached.”); Edgar v. Haines, 141 N.E. 837, 838 (Ohio 1923) (“[T]he mort-
gage security is an incident of the debt which it is given to secure, and, in the absence 
of a specific agreement to the contrary, passes to the assignee or transferee of such 
debt.”); BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. White, 256 P.3d 1014, 1017 (Okla. Civ. 
App. 2010) (“[I]n Oklahoma it is not possible to bifurcate the security interest from 
the note.  An assignment of the mortgage to one other than the holder of the note is of 
no effect.”); Commonwealth Prop. Advocates, LLC v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 
Inc., 263 P.3d 397, 403 (Utah Ct. App. 2011); Bartlett Estate Co. v. Fairhaven Land 
Co., 94 P. 900, 902 (Wash. 1908).  Several states have statutes expressing the same 
position.  See ALA. CODE §8-5-24 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (“The 
transfer of a . . . note given for the purchase money of lands . . . passes to the trans-
feree the lien of the vendor of the lands.”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-817 (West, 
Westlaw through 2012) (“The transfer of any contract or contracts secured by a trust 
deed shall operate as a transfer of the security for such contract or contracts.”); CAL. 
CIVIL CODE § 2936 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (“The assignment of a 
debt secured by [a] mortgage carries with it the security.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-17 
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Spec. Sess.), construed in Chase Home Fin., LLC v. 
Fequiere, 989 A.2d 606, 610-11 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010) (“The statute codifies the 
common-law principle of long standing that ‘the mortgage follows the note’”); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 57-1-35 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Spec. Sess.) (“The transfer of 
any debt secured by a trust deed shall operate as a transfer of the security therefor.”). 
 12. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274 (1872) (“The note and 
mortgage are inseparable . . . . An assignment of the note carries the mortgage with it, 
while an assignment of the latter alone is a nullity.”); Hill v. Favour, 84 P.2d 575, 578 
(Ariz. 1938) (“The mortgage, being a mere incident of the debt, cannot be assigned 
separately from it, so as to give any beneficial interest”).  This position seems unnec-
essarily restrictive because there may be rare occasions in which the holder of the 
note and mortgage will, for legitimate reasons, wish to separate their ownership.  See 
supra note 6. 
7
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assignment,13 or simply apply to the equity court for a decree that the mort-
gage was deemed to be held for the benefit of the noteholder.14  The note-
holder could then foreclose the mortgage as readily as if he or she held a pa-
per assignment of it.15 
B.  The Uses of Recorded Mortgage Assignments 
If a person to whom a note, secured by a mortgage, is transferred with-
out an accompanying assignment of the mortgage itself, can then foreclose 
the mortgage, what is the purpose of mortgage assignments?  A quite plausi-
ble argument can be made that they are simply unnecessary, except perhaps 
as a quick and simple way to prove to a court that the note is indeed secured.  
But as it turns out, mortgage assignments, particularly if they are recorded in 
the public land records, have their purposes.  There are, I suggest below, four 
grounds on which a secondary mortgage market investor might decide that it 
is worthwhile to obtain and record a mortgage assignments.  Before consider-
ing them, however, we need to take a closer look at the recording process 
itself. 
  
 13. See Morris v. Bacon, 123 Mass. 58 (Mass. 1877). 
 14. Pettus v. Gault, 71 A. 509 (Conn. 1908) (holding assignee of note permitted 
to foreclose mortgage, although it was never assigned or delivered to him); Rembert 
v. Ellis, 17 S.E.2d 165 (Ga. 1941) (holding noteholder permitted to foreclose as an 
equitable mortgage despite absence of assignment); Morris Canal & Banking Co. v. 
Fisher, 9 N.J. Eq. 667 (N.J. 1855) (holding assignment of bond acts as an assignment 
of mortgage).  An alternative judicial explanation is that the mortgage interest is held 
in trust for the benefit of the noteholder.  See Barrett v. Hinkley, 14 N.E. 863, 868 (Ill. 
1888) (“Such [mortgagee’s] title exists for the benefit of the holder of the mortgage 
indebtedness, and it can only be enforced by an action in furtherance of his inter-
ests”); Averill v. Cone, 149 A. 297, 299 (Me.1930) (“The result in equity is that the 
legal title passed to the assignee but in naked trust for the owner of the mortgage 
debt”); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 54 (Mass. 2011) (“[T]he 
holder of the mortgage holds the mortgage in trust for the purchaser of the note, who 
has an equitable right to obtain an assignment of the mortgage, which may be accom-
plished by filing an action in court and obtaining an equitable order of assignment.”); 
Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 497 (Minn. 2009) 
(“[A]n assignment of the promissory note operates as an equitable assignment of the 
underlying security instrument.” (emphasis omitted)); Kinna v. Smith, 3 N.J. Eq. 14 
(N.J. Ch. 1834) (heir who receives mortgage from decedent holds it in trust for per-
sonal representative to whom secured note passes); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Mar-
cino, 908 N.E.2d 1032, 1038 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (“[T]he negotiation of a note op-
erates as an equitable assignment of the mortgage, even though the mortgage is not 
assigned or delivered.”); see also 2 GARRARD GLENN, MORTGAGES § 314 (1943); 
GEORGE OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 224 (1951).  
 15. This conclusion follows from common law principles, and has been modified 
by statute in some jurisdictions.  See infra notes 55-69 and accompanying text. 
8
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1.  The Recording System and Mortgage Assignments 
Recording in America is a unique institution, and is quite different than 
the system of title registration employed in most other developed countries.  
Recording a document that conveys or creates an interest in land places it in 
the public domain, where anyone who wishes (and who knows how to locate 
it) can find and read it.  Hence, in general, recorded documents are deemed to 
give constructive notice of their contents to anyone who acquires a subse-
quent interest in the same land.  Thus, a conveyee who records his or her 
conveyance can be sure that the conveyor cannot later “pull the rug out from 
under” the conveyee by making a competing conveyance to someone else.  
On the other hand, if a conveyance is not recorded, the conveyor can do ex-
actly that – provided that the subsequent and competing conveyee qualifies 
under the particular recording by being a bona fide purchaser, recording his 
or her own document first, or both. 
Because conveyees have a strong incentive to record, most conveyances 
are in fact recorded.  This makes it possible, in most cases, for a person who 
is about to acquire an interest in land to perform a "title search" in the public 
records, finding the chain of title (which in theory will extend back to some 
sovereign owner) and ensuring that no holder in that chain of title made an 
"adverse" conveyance to someone outside the chain before creating the next 
link in the chain. 
But one must not place too much confidence in recording or in searching 
titles.  There is no assurance whatever that, merely because a document is 
recorded, it is valid.  It might be a forgery, or for any number of other reasons 
be ineffective.  In addition, there are numerous types of rights or interests in 
land – title by adverse possession is one example – that can arise without 
being documented, and hence without being recorded.  Finally, there is no 
requirement that anyone record a conveyance of land that she or he receives, 
and conveyances are perfectly valid as between their parties without record-
ing – although they are at risk of being made void by a later competing con-
veyance from the same conveyor, as explained above.  For all of these rea-
sons, the popular notion that one can always find out who owns interests in 
land by performing a title search in the public records is fraught with serious 
fallacies.16 
So how do these general principles affect mortgage assignments?  It is 
perhaps best to begin by identifying what a recorded mortgage assignment 
does not do – in addition to its being unnecessary to the noteholder’s right to 
foreclose.  As we have already seen, the assignment, recorded or not, is not 
essential to a completed transfer of the note and mortgage between the mort-
  
 16. All of these principles are well documented and thoroughly discussed else-
where.  See, e.g., WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF 
PROPERTY §§ 11.9-11.11 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, 
PROPERTY]. 
9
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gagee and a transferee, or between successive transferees.17  Likewise, a re-
corded assignment provides no notice to the mortgagor that his or her obliga-
tion has been transferred, and that it is now necessary to begin paying a new 
party.18  This situation follows for the simple reason that to suppose otherwise 
would require us to assume that mortgagors will examine the public records 
before making each payment on their loans – an absurd burden that no sensi-
ble court would inflict on borrowers. 
Similarly, the recording of mortgage assignments is likely to have little 
significance in a case in which the same mortgagee executes and delivers two 
or more competing assignments of the same mortgage.  The recording acts 
may determine which of assignees is regarded as holding the legal interest in 
the real estate security, but under the principles already discussed, whoever 
wins that battle can expect to have the holder of the note successfully demand 
the mortgage as well.  Under U.C.C. Article 9, a purchaser19 of an instrument 
(that is, a promissory note, whether negotiable or not20) can acquire owner-
ship by complying with the following rules, as recently summarized by the 
Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C.:21 
  
 17. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text; see also MetLife Home Loans 
v. Hansen, 286 P.3d 1150 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (“MetLife did not need that assign-
ment in order to vest it with a beneficial interest in the [m]ortgage. As a valid holder 
of the [n]ote, it already had such an interest sufficient to give it standing to initiate a 
foreclosure action.”); Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kabba, 276 P.3d 1006, 1008-09 (Okla. 
2012) (“An assignment of the mortgage, however, is of no consequence because un-
der Oklahoma law, ‘[p]roof of ownership of the note carried with it ownership of the 
mortgage security.’” (quoting Engle v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 300 P.2d 997, 999 
(Okla. 1956))). 
 18. The relevant cases are collected in NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 4, § 5.33 
nn.18-27; see also ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 34.20.010 (West, Westlaw through 2012 
Spec. Sess.) (stating the principle by statute).  Kansas is a notable exception; its courts 
have held that mortgagors are bound by constructive notice from a recorded assign-
ment.  See Walmer v. Redinger, 227 P. 329 (Kan. 1924); Verle R. Seed, Mortgage 
“Payment” Statutes in Kansas and New Mexico, 3 U. KAN. L. REV. 87, 95-96 (1954). 
 19. Somewhat confusingly, Article 9 employs the terminology of security or 
collateral assignments to outright sales of notes as well; thus the transferor is termed 
the “debtor,” the transferee is the “secured party,” and the rights transferred constitute 
a “security interest” even when an outright sale occurs.  See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(28)(B) 
(2012) (defining “debtor”); § 9-102(a)(72)(D) (defining “secured party”).  In the text 
above, I have “translated” the terminology to that ordinarily used in describing out-
right sales of notes. 
 20. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(47) defines an “instrument” as “a negotiable instrument or 
any other writing that evidences a right to the payment of a monetary obligation . . . 
and is of a type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by delivery with any 
necessary endorsement or assignment.”  Nonnegotiable instruments are plainly cov-
ered by this language. 
 21. PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, AM. LAW 
INST., APPLICATION OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE TO SELECTED ISSUES 
RELATING TO MORTGAGE NOTES 9-10 nn.33-40 (2011) [hereinafter PEB REPORT].  
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Section 9-203(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that 
three criteria must be fulfilled . . . .  The first two criteria are 
straightforward – “value” must be given22 and the debtor/seller 
must have rights in the note or the power to transfer rights in the 
note to a third party. . . .23  The third criterion may be fulfilled in 
either one of two ways.  Either the debtor/seller must “authenti-
cate”24 a “security agreement”25 that describes the note26 or the se-
cured party must take possession27 of the note pursuant to the 
debtor’s security agreement.28 
Thus, either a delivery of possession of the note or the execution of a 
written document of assignment of the note will serve to transfer its owner-
ship.  And under U.C.C section9-203(g), the transfer of “a right to payment or 
performance secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or real 
property is also attachment of a security interest29 in the security interest, 
  
Footnotes attached to the quoted text below are those of the original PEB report.  
Note that the discussion in the text refers to “ownership” of the note, which is indeed 
the subject of U.C.C. Article 9.  Under the U.C.C., however, ownership may be sepa-
rated from the right to enforce the note; the right to enforce is the subject of U.C.C. 
Article 3 if the note is negotiable.  See  infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text. 
 22. See PEB REPORT, supra note 21, at 9, 9 n.33 (“U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(1).  U.C.C. 
§ 1-204 provides that giving ‘value’ for rights includes not only acquiring them for 
consideration but also acquiring them in return for a binding commitment to extend 
credit, as security for or in complete or partial satisfaction of a preexisting claim, or 
by accepting delivery of them under a preexisting contract for their purchase.”). 
 23. Id. at 9, 9 n.34 (“U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(2).  Limited rights that are short of full 
ownership are sufficient for this purpose.  See Official Comment 6 to U.C.C. § 9-
203.”). 
 24. Id. at 9, 9 n.35 (“This term is defined to include signing and its electronic 
equivalent.  See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(7).”). 
 25. Id. at 9, 9 n.36 (“A ‘security agreement’ is an agreement that creates or pro-
vides for a security interest (including the rights of a buyer arising upon the outright 
sale of a payment right).  See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(73).”). 
 26. Id. at 9, 9 n.37 (“Article 9’s criteria for descriptions of property in a security 
agreement are quite flexible.  Generally speaking, any description suffices, whether or 
not specific, if it reasonably identifies the property.  See U.C.C. § 9-108(a)-(b).  A 
‘supergeneric’ description consisting solely of words such as ‘all of the debtor’s as-
sets’ or ‘all of the debtor’s personal property’ is not sufficient, however.  U.C.C. § 9-
108(c).  A narrower description, limiting the property to a particular category or type, 
such as ‘all notes,’ is sufficient.  For example, a description that refers to ‘all of the 
debtor’s notes’ is sufficient.”). 
 27. Id. at 9, 9 n.38 (“See U.C.C. § 9-313.”) (remainder of footnote omitted). 
 28. Id. at 9-10, 10 n.39 (“U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(3)(A)-(B).”). 
 29. Because of Article 9’s use of the phrase “security interest” to encompass 
outright sales, as explained supra note 19, this line can more readily understood in the 
context of sales of mortgage notes by rewriting it to say, “the transfer of a promissory 
note secured by a mortgage on real property is also a transfer of the mortgage.” 
11
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mortgage, or other lien.”  This provision is, of course, reminiscent of the 
common law principle that the mortgage follows the note.30  Hence, which of 
the competing holders of mortgage assignments will prevail under the record-
ing act is likely to be irrelevant in practical terms; the transferee of ownership 
of the note, as determined by Article 9, will have the benefit of the mortgage 
as well.31 
If the foregoing are not persuasive reasons to record mortgage assign-
ments, what incentives exist for market participants to record their ownership 
on a current, timely basis? The next four subsections will discuss plausible 
reasons to record. 
2.  Prevention of Fraud by the Transferor 
This reason for recording a mortgage assignment is based on the notice-
giving effect of recording mentioned above.  If an original mortgagee trans-
fers the note, but there is no recorded mortgage assignment, it appears on the 
public records as if the mortgagee still holds the mortgage.  This appearance 
opens an opportunity for the mortgagee to engage in a variety of fraudulent 
but potentially successful tricks, in cahoots with the mortgagor.   
For example, the mortgagee may issue and record a satisfaction of the 
mortgage, allowing the mortgagor to sell the property free and clear of the 
encumbrance to a bona fide purchaser or to remortgage it for a new loan.32  
  
 30. But it is not quite the same.  The common law principle is that the mortgage 
will follow the right to enforce the note.  In cases in which ownership of a note (Arti-
cle 9’s bailiwick) and the right to enforce it (Article 3’s bailiwick) are separated, it is 
the right to enforce that carries with it the mortgage, because foreclosure of the mort-
gage is simply a means of enforcing the note.  See infra notes 90-92 and accompany-
ing text on the issue of separation.  There is no reason to regard U.C.C. § 9-203(g) as 
supplanting the common law or exhausting the topic.  For example, if the owner of 
the note delivers it to its servicer for the purpose of enforcing it, thus transferring the 
entitlement to enforce under Article 3, there is every reason to think the servicer will, 
under common law principles, be entitled to foreclose the mortgage as well, with or 
without a formal mortgage assignment.  Nothing about § 9-203(g) bars this result. 
 31. This was the conclusion reached by the court under an earlier version of the 
U.C.C. in American Bank of the South v. Rothenberg, 598 So. 2d 289 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1992).  The statement in the text assumes that the owner and the person “entitled 
to enforce the note” are the same, as is usually the case.  See RMS Residential Props., 
LLC v. Miller, 32 A.3d 307, 314 (Conn. 2011) (“[A] holder of a note is presumed to 
be the owner of the debt, and unless the presumption is rebutted, may foreclose the 
mortgage”).  If the owner and the person entitled to enforce are different, only the 
latter or the agent of the latter will be able to foreclose the mortgage under common 
law principles.  See Edelstein v. Bank of New York Mellon, 286 P.3d 249 (Nev. 
2012) (making it clear that it is the right to enforce, and not ownership of the note, 
that confers the power to foreclose the mortgage). 
 32. See, e.g., Ameribanc Sav. Banks v. Resolution Trust Corp., 858 F. Supp. 
576, 582 (E.D. Va. 1994); Tomsic v. Beaulac (In re Beaulac), 298 B.R. 31 (Bankr. D. 
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He or she may subordinate the mortgage to a subsequent lien obtained in 
good faith, thereby greatly reducing the value of the mortgage as security, or 
may even foreclose the mortgage, obtain title, and sell the land to a bona fide 
purchaser.33  In each of these cases (and several other variations on them), the 
courts have held that a bona fide purchaser or secured creditor of the real 
estate, relying on the apparent state of the title, will prevail over the holder of 
the mortgage debt.  The facts that the note may be negotiable and that the 
noteholder may be a Holder in Due Course are irrelevant.  In all of these 
cases, the recording of a mortgage assignment would have prevented the 
mortgagee from perpetrating the fraud, because it would have made it obvi-
ous on the face of the public records that the original mortgagee no longer 
had any authority to deal with the land. 
Is this risk (assuming secondary market mortgage investors and their 
counsel are aware of it) enough to convince them to record mortgage assign-
ments?  Practically speaking, probably not.  Essentially, the jeopardy here is 
that the mortgage originator will become a criminal and turn to fraud.  While 
such cases have occurred and will doubtless occur in the future,34 they are 
probably quite rare.  Most lawyers would, of course, warn their clients to 
record assignments in order to mitigate this risk, but many clients would 
likely conclude that doing so was not worth the trouble and expense.35 
3.  Assurance of Receiving Notice of Legal Proceedings 
The notice-giving effect of recording, discussed above, applies not only 
to provide notice to persons who acquire subsequent interests in the land but 
those who file suits or other legal proceedings against it as well.  Suppose a 
secondary market investor buys a mortgage loan, but records no assignment.  
  
Mass. 2003) (trustee in bankruptcy as BFP under strong-arm powers); Kan. City 
Mortg. Co. v. Crowell, 239 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Fed. Nat’l 
Mortg. Ass’n v. Kuipers, 732 N.E.2d 723 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000); Brenner v. Neu, 170 
N.E.2d 897 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960); Henniges v. Johnson, 84 N.W. 350 (N.D. 1900); 
Kalen v. Gelderman, 278 N.W. 165 (S.D. 1938); Fannin Inv. & Dev. Co. v. Neuhaus, 
427 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); Marling v. Milwaukee Realty Co., 106 N.W. 
844, 845 (Wis. 1906). 
 33. See, e.g., Huitink v. Thompson, 104 N.W. 237 (Minn. 1905); Bremen Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Muskopf, 817 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. App. E.D. 1991); Willamette Collec-
tion & Credit Serv. v. Gray, 70 P.2d 39 (Or. 1937). 
 34. See, e.g., Impac Warehouse Lending Grp. v. Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, 
270 Fed. App’x 570 (9th Cir. 2008) (originating lender gave fraudulent loan docu-
ments to creditor providing line of credit, while selling original loan documents on the 
secondary mortgage market). 
 35. Moreover, recording an assignment does not inoculate the mortgage payoff 
process against other types of fraud. See America’s Wholesale Lender, FRAUD 
INSIGHTS, Feb. 2012, http://fraudinsights.fnf.com/vol07iss02/fullarticle.htm #arti-
cle01a (describing a case in which a crook impersonated the holder of the loan and 
purported to approve a payoff of the loan to a false bank account). 
13
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Then a suit is filed that could jeopardize the validity or priority of the mort-
gage.  One obvious example is a foreclosure of a mortgage senior to the one 
in question.  The plaintiff in that foreclosure action performs a title examina-
tion, discovers the identity of the original mortgagee or previous holder of the 
mortgage, and makes service of process on that party.  The actual (but unre-
corded) holder of the mortgage gets no direct service (because there is no 
obvious way for the plaintiff to identify the holder), and may or may not learn 
of the suit from the party who was actually served. 
This is precisely what occurred in Fifth Third Bank v. NCS Mortgage 
Lending Co.36  In Fifth Third Bank an Ohio court found the judgment binding 
on the secondary market investor, which had never learned of or entered an 
appearance in the litigation, despite its claim that it had instructed its prede-
cessor to record an assignment of the mortgage – an act that was “inexplica-
bly” never done.37  Because most secondary market investors use independent 
servicers to manage their mortgage portfolios, an investor may prefer to have 
a recorded assignment run to its servicer rather than itself.  In this way, any 
notice issued will find its way directly to the entity that is responsible for the 
loan, rather than having to take the circuitous route of going first to the inves-
tor, who will then need to notify the servicer.  But in Fifth Third Bank, no 
assignment at all was recorded, and hence no notice was directed either to the 
investor or its servicer.38 
Alternatively, the investor may prefer to have an assignment recorded to 
MERS, the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, about which we will 
have much more to say later.  MERS is merely a nominee for the investor, but 
it operates a “mail room” function, keeping a record of all investors and 
servicers, and redirecting to the relevant servicer any notice that it receives 
with respect to a particular mortgage.  Unfortunately, this notion is not fool-
proof, for it depends on the courts taking the same view of MERS that MERS 
itself takes.  In Landmark National Bank v. Kesler,39 the original mortgagee 
named in the junior mortgage was MERS, as nominee for the actual lender.  
The senior mortgagee filed a foreclosure action, but never served either 
MERS or the junior lender, and a default judgment was entered against both 
  
 36. 860 N.E.2d 785 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). 
 37. Id. at 786. 
 38. Id.   
 39. 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009); see also Lang v. Butler, 483 P.2d 994 (Colo. App. 
1971) (finding that a foreclosing senior deed of trust holder had no obligation to give 
notice to the holder of an unrecorded junior deed of trust); Citimortgage, Inc. v. Bara-
bas, 950 N.E.2d 12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (same), vacated, 975 N.E.2d 805 (Ind. 2012); 
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Sw. Homes of Ark., 301 S.W.3d 1 (Ark. 2009) 
(reaching a similar conclusion where MERS was the nominee of the senior deed of 
trust holder, and was held to have no right to notice of the foreclosure of the junior 
deed of trust, the holder of which apparently falsely alleged that it was senior; notice 
was given to the original holder of the senior deed of trust, but it no longer held the 
loan, although no assignment from it had been recorded).  
14
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of them, wiping out the second mortgage.40  The Kansas Supreme Court 
found no error in the trial judge’s refusal to set aside the default judgment – 
against the junior mortgagee because there was no assignment to it in the 
public records,41 and against MERS because it was merely a nominee, had 
advanced no funds under the mortgage loan, and was therefore not a real 
party in interest.42  This result may seem like the ultimate “Catch-22,” but it 
illustrates starkly how failing to record an assignment to the right party can 
leave a mortgage investor exposed to the drastic losses that may flow from 
failure to get notice of pending litigation.  
Foreclosures of prior mortgages are not the only examples of this risk.  
Other possibilities include an eminent domain action, a government forfeiture 
proceeding,43 a quiet title action, or an action to enforce a zoning, housing 
code, or building code infraction.  It is obviously in the interest of a mortgage 
holder and its servicer to get immediate notice of such suits because they can 
have a powerful effect on the value of the real estate collateral.  However, 
suits of all these kinds are relatively rare.  Protection against them, like pro-
tection against foreclosures of prior liens, may well be an insufficient incen-
tive to convince secondary market investors to record mortgage assignments. 
4.  Recordation of Assignments as a Practical Necessity for Future 
Title Examiners 
Another reason to record mortgage assignments might be to serve the ti-
tle industry and the system of records on which it depends.  When a mortgage 
is foreclosed future title examiners may want to be able to locate a complete 
and recorded chain of title establishing that the party foreclosing the mort-
gage is the person with the right to do so.  Otherwise, title examiners may 
say, they will be faced with cases in which A mortgages land to B, and some 
time later C forecloses and a foreclosure deed is delivered to D.  The problem 
is that it is not apparent on the face of the land records why C had the right to 
foreclose. 
  
 40. Landmark Nat’l Bank, 216 P.3d at 162. 
 41. See id. at 167. 
 42. Id.  
 43. The federal government may maintain a “criminal forfeiture” action pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 982 (2006) and 21 U.S.C. § 881 against property used in the commis-
sion in certain crimes.  The title to real estate so forfeited “relates back” to the date of 
the first commission of illegal activity.  See 21 U.S.C. § 881(h).  Hence the effective 
date of vesting of title in the government could be earlier than the creation of a mort-
gage on the land.  There is an exception for owners of secured mortgages unconnected 
to the illegal activity.  See 21 U.S.C. § 853(n).  However, such “innocent owners” 
must file a petition within 30 days of receipt of notice of the forfeiture, which they 
only will receive if their interest is properly recorded.  Id.; see also United States v. 
Schecter, 251 F.3d 490, 497 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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While this argument seems plausible, in reality it is highly dubious, and 
assignments based on it are almost certainly unnecessary.  To show why this 
is so, we need to consider each of the three types of foreclosure processes that 
are common in the United States. 
First, consider a judicial foreclosure.  Here, the court’s foreclosure order 
implies that the judge has verified under oath that the party seeking foreclo-
sure has demonstrated the right to enforce the note.  As we have already 
seen,44 under traditional mortgage law, having the right to foreclose depends 
on holding the obligation represented by the note, not on having an assign-
ment of the mortgage, recorded or not.  Leaving aside for a moment the ques-
tion of exactly what evidence the judge will demand before ordering a fore-
closure,45 if the judge concludes that the right person – namely, the person 
with the right to enforce the note – is foreclosing, that conclusion can be the 
end of the inquiry.  Assuming that the time for any possible appeal of the 
court’s order has run, it is res judicata and can be relied upon by any future 
title examiner.46  Hence, the existence of a chain of assignments is irrelevant. 
Second, suppose the security instrument is a deed of trust, foreclosed by 
trustee’s sale.  In this setting the trustee (or a substitute trustee, if there is a 
recorded substitution) is literally the titleholder, and if the trustee forecloses, 
it can be presumed (and there is often a statutory presumption)47 that the trus-
  
 44. See supra notes 9-15 and accompanying text. 
 45. Of course, the judge, in turn, might demand a recorded chain of mortgage 
assignments.  See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 1:07CV2282, 07CV2532, 
07CV2560, 07CV2602, 07CV2631, 07CV2638, 07CV2681, 07CV2695, 07CV2920, 
07CV2930, 07CV2949, 07CV2950, 07CV3000, 07CV3029, 2007 WL 3232430, at 
*1-2 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007) (requiring foreclosing parties to produce assign-
ments).  However, there appears to be no such requirement in Ohio law, and to this 
extent the judge’s demand seems unwarranted.  The critical issue for the court to 
determine is the right of the foreclosing party to enforce the note. 
 46. This is not to say that a collateral attack on a foreclosure judgment is impos-
sible, particularly if the judgment was obtained despite the defendant’s failure to 
appear.  See, e.g., Ramagli Realty Co. v. Craver, 121 So. 2d 648, 654 (Fla. 1960) (“As 
between the parties any judgment or order procured from any court by the practice of 
fraud or deception may in appropriate proceedings be set aside at any time.  A void 
judgment is a nullity, a brutum fulmen and is subject to collateral attack and may be 
stricken at any time.”).  But the presence or absence of a chain of assignments is 
likely to have very little relationship to the grounds – “fraud or deception” – for set-
ting aside a judgment. 
 47. These presumptions vary in weight; some of them apply only to the notice 
given and the mechanics of the sale itself, and hence would have little value in estab-
lishing that the foreclosing party had the right to foreclose.  See ALASKA STAT. § 
34.20.090 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Spec. Sess.); CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924 (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-162.4 (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-21.17A (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 Reg. Sess.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-1-4 (West, Westlaw through 2012 
Sess.).  Others are stronger, apparently covering all aspects of the foreclosure.  See 
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tee is acting on the instruction of the proper beneficiary.  This presumption is 
valid whether the beneficiary is the original noteholder or a subsequent trans-
feree from the original noteholder.48  If the trustee can be relied upon to make 
this determination – much like the judge in a judicial foreclosure – then as 
with judicial foreclosure, the existence of a recorded assignment or chain of 
assignments should be unnecessary to future title examiners.49  Such reliance 
is a fundamental premise of foreclosure by trustee’s sale. 
  
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-811 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.), construed 
in U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Myers, No. 1 CA–CV 10–0780, 2011 WL 6747428, at *2 
(Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-111 (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 Fiscal Sess.); HAW. REV. STAT. § 667-33 to -32 (West, Westlaw through 
2012 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO CODE ANN.  § 45-1510 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.19 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Spec. Sess.); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-318 (West, Westlaw through 2011 laws); NEB. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 76-1010 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
107.030 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-14 
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 47 (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.780 (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 Reg. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-1-28 (West, Westlaw through 2012 
Spec. Sess.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.040 (West, Westlaw through 2012 
Legis. Measures).  All of them are available only in favor of a bona fide purchaser.  
See generally Grant S. Nelson & Dale A. Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure: The 
Uniform Non-judicial Foreclosure Act, 53 DUKE L.J. 1399, 1503-06 (2004) [hereinaf-
ter Nelson & Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure]. 
 48. The non-judicial foreclosure statutes are frequently obscure in indicating 
who is authorized to instruct the trustee of a deed of trust to foreclose.  Indeed, per-
haps because most of them were enacted when the secondary mortgage market was 
largely undeveloped, they often seem to have been drafted with no recognition that 
such a market exists.   See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59(7) (West, Westlaw through 
2012 Spec. Sess.) (trustee may foreclose “at the request of any beneficiary[,]” but 
inferentially the trustee is expected to demand to see the note, because § 55-59.1(B) 
begins, “[i]f a note or other evidence of indebtedness secured by a deed of trust is lost 
or for any reason cannot be produced . . .”).  Arizona is likewise ambiguous in de-
scribing the nature of the proof of authority the trustee must show.  See Hogan v. 
Washington Mut. Bank, 277 P.3d 781, 783 (Ariz. 2012) (“The only proof of authority 
the trustee’s sales statutes require is a statement indicating the basis for the trustee’s 
authority.  See A.R.S. § 33-808(C)(5) (requiring the notice to set forth ‘the basis for 
the trustee’s qualification pursuant to § 33-803, subsection A’)”). 
 49. The California presumption statute covers only “the mailing of copies of 
notices or the publication of a copy of the notice of default or the personal delivery of 
the copy of the notice of default or the posting of copies of the notice of sale or the 
publication of a copy thereof[.]”  See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924(c).  Despite this relative 
weakness, the California courts have sometimes seemed to impose a much stronger 
presumption of compliance with the foreclosure process:  
If the trustee’s deed recites that all statutory 
notice requirements and procedures required 
by law for the conduct of the foreclosure have 
been satisfied, a rebuttable presumption arises 
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A third possible foreclosure mode is non-judicial foreclosure of a mort-
gage.  In nine states, mortgagees and their successors may exercise a direct 
power of sale.50  No deed of trust is involved, and there is no trustee to exer-
cise independent judgment.  In this setting, if the mortgage is sold on the sec-
ondary market and then foreclosed, and if there is no recorded assignment, it 
is literally a case of A (the mortgagor) to B (the mortgagee) and C (the sec-
ondary market holder to D (the foreclosure purchaser), with nothing in the 
public records to connect B to C.51  Some members of the title industry seem 
to argue that a recorded assignment is essential in this setting,52 but this ar-
gument is unconvincing.  Proof of the existence of a recorded assignment or 
chain of assignments proves nothing about whether the foreclosing party held 
the promissory note at the time of the foreclosure, and it is the holding of the 
  
that the sale has been conducted regularly and 
properly; this presumption is conclusive as to a 
bona fide purchaser . . . . Thus, as a general 
rule, a trustor has no right to set aside a trus-
tee’s deed as against a bona fide purchaser for 
value by attacking the validity of the sale.  
Moeller v. Lien, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).  
 50. See ALA. CODE §§ 35-10-1 to 35-10-10 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Spec. 
Sess.); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 23-2-114, 44-14-162 to 44-14-162.4 (West, Westlaw 
through 2012 Reg. Sess.); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14 §§ 6203-A, 6203-B (2011) (applica-
ble only to nonresidential property); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183, § 21 (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 2d. Ann. Sess.); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 580.01 to 580.20 (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 Spec. Sess.); MISS. CODE. ANN. §§ 89-1-53 to 89-1-57 (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 479:25 to 479:27-a  
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 34-11-22 (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-4-101 to 34-4-113  
(West, Westlaw through 2012 Budget Sess.). 
 51. The title insurance industry’s trade association has argued that the mortgage 
assignment is the critical and sole document needed to complete the chain of title in 
this setting.  See  ALTA Files Brief in Massachusetts Foreclosure Case, TITLE NEWS, 
Mar. 2012, at 7, 8, http://www.alta.org/publications/titlenews/12/Volume91  
_Issue03.pdf. 
 52. The Minnesota Supreme Court was convinced that benefitting future title 
examiners was the purpose of the Minnesota statutory requirement for recording 
mortgage assignments.  See Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 
N.W.2d 487, 498 (Minn. 2009) (“[T]he record, without the aid of extraneous evi-
dence, ‘put[s] the title of the assignee of a mortgage beyond doubt.’” (quoting Soufal 
v. Griffith, 198 N.W. 807, 809 (Minn. 1924))).  Arguably the need for a chain of 
assignments is lessened if the foreclosure is confirmed by a judicial decree, as is true 
in some circumstances in a few non-judicial foreclosure states.  See GA. CODE ANN. § 
44-14-161 (requiring judicial confirmation of sale if secured party seeks a deficiency 
judgment; court is to consider “the legality of the notice, advertisement, and regularity 
of the sale”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-21.27 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.) (requiring confirmation by clerk of court if an upset bid is filed following fore-
closure sale). 
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note that gives one the right to foreclose.  If any recorded evidence is needed, 
it is evidence as to who holds the note, but no American jurisdiction seems to 
require recording of evidence of transfer of the note as a condition of the right 
to foreclose.53  
In sum, the comfort provided to title examiners by chains of assignments 
in mortgage foreclosures is illusory.  If the note is negotiable, the important 
question is whether the foreclosure was done by the person entitled to enforce 
the note – a status which, as I will discuss in detail below, usually depends on 
physical possession of the note.54  Finding a mortgage assignment is no proof 
at all that the note was not previously assigned to someone else.  Thus, a re-
corded chain of assignments may make a subsequent title examiner feel good, 
but it is weak evidence on which to rely.  Its supposed benefits to title exam-
iners are likely insufficient to induce mortgage investors to record. 
5.  Recordation of Assignments as a Statutory Prerequisite to Foreclo-
sure 
By statute, eleven states require the existence or recordation of a chain 
of assignments from the originating mortgagee to the foreclosing party as a 
prerequisite to foreclosure.55  They include California,56 Georgia,57 Idaho,58 
  
 53. Virginia makes provision for the optional recording of a “Certificate of 
Transfer” which memorializes the transfer of the indebtedness.  See VA. CODE ANN. § 
55-66.01 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Spec. Sess.).  However, there is no require-
ment that such a certificate or chain of certificates be recorded as a prerequisite to 
foreclosure.  See Horvath v. Bank of New York, 641 F.3d 617, 626 (4th Cir. 2011) 
(Virginia law) (“[P]arties may elect to record the transfer in the land records, but their 
failure to do so does not undermine the transaction in any way.”). 
 54. See infra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
 55. In addition to the states listed, Mississippi’s statute seems to require recorda-
tion of assignments, but apparently the only sanction for failure to record is that a 
payment made by the mortgagor to the original mortgagee is binding despite the as-
signment, unless the mortgagor has actual notice of the assignment. See MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 89-5-17.  Hence, recording of assignments does not appear to be a condition 
to foreclosure, although there is no case law construing the point.  Similarly, an Indi-
ana statute seems to require recordation of assignments; see IND. CODE ANN. § 32-29-
1-8(c) (West, Westlaw through 2013) (“an assignment of mortgage must be recorded 
on a separate written instrument from the mortgage”).  However, the provision has 
been construed as only for the protection of subsequent purchasers from the mortga-
gee, and not as a requirement for foreclosure.  Indiana follows the common law doc-
trine that the mortgage follows the note without a written assignment.  See Perry v. 
Fisher, 65 N.E. 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 1903). 
  A few states require a chain of recorded assignments as a matter of court-
made law for judicial foreclosure.  See, e.g., In re Foreclosure Cases, Nos. 
1:07CV2282, 07CV2532, 07CV2560, 07CV2602, 07CV2631, 07CV2638, 
07CV2681, 07CV2695, 07CV2920, 07CV2930, 07CV2949, 07CV2950, 07CV3000, 
07CV3029, 2007 WL 3232430, at *1-2  (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007); Gee v. U.S. Bank 
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Maine,59 Massachusetts,60 Michigan,61 Minnesota,62 Nevada,63 Oregon,64 
South Dakota,65 and Wyoming.66  In all cases except Maine, these statutes 
  
Nat’l Ass'n, 72 So. 3d 211, 213 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).  Such decisions appear to 
disregard the common-law principle that the mortgage follows the note automatically.  
Florida law on this point is in doubt.  See Musselman v. Deutsche Trust Co. Ams. (In 
re Balderrama) 451 B.R. 185, 190 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) (“[P]roof of ownership of 
the debt underlying a mortgage is sufficient under Florida law to equitably convey the 
mortgage to the debt holder.”). 
 56. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2932.5 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.).  Case-
law has held that this statute is applicable only to mortgages and not to deeds of trust.  
See Haynes v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 32, 34 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012); 
Calvo v. HSBC Bank, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 815, 818 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011).  But see Cruz 
v. Aurora Loan Servs. LLC (In re Cruz), 457 B.R. 806, 818 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011) 
(disagreeing with Calvo and holding CAL. CIV. CODE § 2932.5 applicable to deeds of 
trust); In re Salazar, 448 B.R. 814, 821 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 2011) (same), rev’d and 
remanded, 470 B.R. 557 (S.D. Cal. 2012); Roger Bernhardt, Midcourse Corrections: 
The Uncertain Requirements for Recording Assignments of Deeds of Trust, 
ROGERBERNHARDT.COM (Nov. 9, 2011) http://www.rogerbernhardt.com 
/index.php/ceb-columns/318-recording-dot-assignments-calvo-v-hsbc (suggesting that 
the recording requirement is largely useless in any event). 
 57. GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-162(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) 
(“The security instrument or assignment thereof vesting the secured creditor with title 
to the security instrument shall be filed prior to the time of sale in the office of the 
clerk of the superior court of the county in which the real property is located.”); Duke 
Galish LLC v. SouthCrest Bank, 726 S.E.2d 54, 56 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012) (holding 
failure to record was cured by recording and reforeclosure). 
 58. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1505(1) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). 
 59. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321 (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. 
Sess.) (“The mortgagee shall . . . produce evidence of the mortgage note, mortgage 
and all assignments and endorsements of the mortgage note and mortgage.”); id. § 
6203-A (providing a statutory form of foreclosure notice requiring a recitation of the 
foreclosing party’s mortgage recording information and states, “if by assignment . . . 
give reference.”). 
 60. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.183, § 21 (West, Westlaw through 2012 2d Ann. 
Sess.) (mortgage may be foreclosed by power of sale by “the mortgagee or his execu-
tors, administrators, successors or assigns”), construed in U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. 
Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 53 (Mass. 2011) (requiring a written assignment or chain of 
assignments, but not necessarily recorded). 
 61. MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 600.3204(c) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.); see Arnold v. DMR Fin. Servs., Inc., 532 N.W.2d 852, 855-56 (Mich. 1995) 
(holding foreclosure by holder of note who lacked a recorded chain of assignments 
was voidable, not void, and would be upheld if the mortgagor was not harmed). 
 62. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.02(3) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Spec. Sess.).  
But see Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487 (Minn. 2009) 
(holding that MERS could foreclose by advertisement on behalf of member lenders 
for whom it was acting as nominee without recording assignments from MERS to the 
lenders). 
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apply only to non-judicial (power of sale) foreclosure.67  However, why a 
chain of assignments should be required is not made clear by the statutes.  In 
fact, the requirement seems a bit more logical in states which do not consider 
the mortgage to follow the note automatically, but instead authorize the fore-
closure court to declare that the mortgage is held in trust for the benefit of the 
noteholder, because in a non-judicial foreclosure there is no court to make 
that declaration.68  Oddly, several other states using non-judicial foreclosure 
have held, by case law or statute, that a chain of assignments is not essential 
to a proper foreclosure.69 
  
 63. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.086(4) (West, Westlaw through 2011 Reg. 
Sess.) (requiring mediation for residential deeds of trust as a precondition to foreclo-
sure and providing that the beneficiary of the deed of trust “shall bring to the media-
tion the original or a certified copy of the deed of trust, the mortgage note and each 
assignment of the deed of trust or mortgage note”).  In what was probably a miscon-
struction of the statute, the Nevada Supreme Court held that this language mandated 
that the applicable assignment or assignments be produced at the mediation.  Leyva v. 
Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 255 P.3d 1275, 1279 (Nev. 2011). 
 64. OR. REV. STAT. § 86.735 (Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); see Barnett v. 
BAC Home Loan Servicing, L.P., 772 F. Supp. 2d 1328 (D. Or. 2011) (enjoining a 
non-judicial foreclosure sale because the foreclosing party lacked a recorded chain of 
assignments).  The statute was construed to disallow assignments by MERS.  McCoy 
v. BNC Mortg., Inc. (In re McCoy), 446 B.R. 453 (Bankr. D. Or. 2011); Niday v. 
GMAC Mortg., LLC,  284 P.3d 1157, 1168 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). 
 65. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-48-2 (Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.). 
 66. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-4-103 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Budget Sess.); 
see Bitker v. First Nat’l Bank, 98 P.3d 853, 856-57 (Wyo. 2004) (treating actual no-
tice of the assignment to the mortgagor as the equivalent of recording for this pur-
pose). 
 67. If an assignment is required, it presumably must be completed before the 
foreclosure is commenced.  See Jeff-Ray Corp. v. Jacobson, 566 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1990); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 54 (Mass. 
2011).  It could be argued that U.C.C. § 9-203(g) (2012), providing that “[t]he at-
tachment of a security interest in a right to payment or performance secured by a 
security interest or other lien on personal or real property is also attachment of a secu-
rity interest in the security interest, mortgage, or other lien[,]” should be held to over-
ride other state law requiring the existence or recording of mortgage assignments as a 
precondition of foreclosure.  In fact, however, none of the jurisdictions with such 
statutory requirements has ever held (or even considered, so far as I can determine) 
that § 9-203(g) would have this effect. 
 68. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  In Massachusetts, for example, 
“the holder of the mortgage holds the mortgage in trust for the purchaser of the note, 
who has an equitable right to obtain an assignment of the mortgage, which may be 
accomplished by filing an action in court and obtaining an equitable order of assign-
ment.”  Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 54. 
 69. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-17 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Spec. 
Sess.), construed in Bankers Trust Co. v. Vaneck, 899 A.2d 41 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2006); Harton v. Little, 57 So. 851 (Ala. 1911); Vasquez v. Saxon Mortg., Inc. (In re 
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Overall, it is doubtful that there is any sensible rationale for a statutory 
requirement of a chain of mortgage assignments.  Indeed, such a requirement 
can be mischievous and produce dramatically unfair results if no assignment 
was given when the loan was sold, and by the time foreclosure occurs it is 
practically impossible to obtain one.  Consider Euihyung Kim v. JP Morgan 
Chase Bank,70 decided in Michigan, which has such a statute applicable to 
non-judicial “foreclosure by advertisement.”  In that case the originating 
mortgage lender had been taken over by the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (“FDIC”) as receiver, and the FDIC in turn had sold all of the 
lender’s loans, including the mortgage in question, to JP Morgan Chase pur-
suant to a blanket “Purchase and Assumption Agreement.”71  Hence, there 
was no individual assignment of the mortgage for JP Morgan to record.  The 
court found the foreclosure void,72 which is an absurd result but one the court 
thought mandated by the statute.  Of course, the bank could now foreclose 
judicially, but the runaround seems pointless.  What would a recorded as-
signment prove about the bank’s right to foreclose?  Nothing at all, but it 
would satisfy the statute. 
6.  Conclusion: What are Assignments Worth? 
As we have seen above, a recorded assignment or chain of assignments 
of a mortgage can provide two valuable benefits to the mortgage’s holder: (1) 
protection against a fraudulent discharge or further encumbrance by a prior 
holder of the mortgage;73 (2) assurance of receiving notice of the filing of a 
suit that might affect the holder’s rights.74  A third supposed benefit is confi-
dence that a foreclosure of the mortgage will appear in the public records to 
be credible in the eyes of future title examiners.75  But as we have seen, belief 
in this “benefit” is entirely misplaced, for a recorded assignment actually 
provides no significant value to title examiners at all.  Finally, to carry out a 
valid non-judicial foreclosure in some states, a chain of assignments may be 
absolutely mandatory by statute, whether this makes any sense in terms of 
good policy or not.76  Outside the eleven states with such statutes, the incen-
tive for investors to record mortgage assignments is really quite weak. 
  
Vasquez), 266 P.3d 1053, 1055 (Ariz. 2011); see also In re Tucker, 441 B.R. 638, 
644-45 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2010) (reaching the same conclusion under Missouri law). 
 70. 813 N.W.2d 778, 780-81 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012), appeal granted, 811 
N.W.2d 498 (Mich. 2012).  I am indebted to Robert Bozarth, National Agency Coun-
sel at Fidelity National Title Group, for calling this case to my attention. 
 71. Id. at 779-80. 
 72. Id. at 783. 
 73. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. 
 74. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.   
 75. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
 76. See supra notes 55-72 and accompanying text. 
22
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol78/iss1/2
File: WhitmanPaginated.docx Created on: 10/21/13 8:58 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:14 PM 
2013] A FEDERAL MORTGAGE REGISTRY 23 
 
Note that only the first two benefits of recording mortgage assignments 
mentioned above require current, timely recordation when transfers occur.  
The “chain of title” rationale (even if one accepts it) and the statutory man-
dates to record apply only when there is a foreclosure or payoff of the loan.  
For this reason, many secondary market investors have long followed the 
practice of obtaining assignments, but not bothering to record them at the 
time of acquisition of the loan.  More than 25 years ago, two knowledgeable 
commentators wrote: 
Although assignment[s] must be executed and delivered, recorda-
tion for some buyers [of mortgage loans] is not necessary unless it 
is required by law to perfect the buyer’s ownership interest or is 
commonly required in the region by other mortgage buyers.77 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac continue, to this day, not to require current 
recording of assignments of the non-MERS mortgages that they purchase,78 
and most other investors probably do the same.79  Of course, a secondary 
  
 77. CHARLES L. EDSON & BARRY G. JACOBS, SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET 
GUIDE § 9.03[1][c] (1986).  
 78. See FANNIE MAE, SELLING GUIDE: FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY 936 (2012), 
http://www.mooreeducation.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Fannie-Mae-Selling-
Guide.pdf (“Lenders must prepare an assignment of the mortgage to Fannie Mae for 
any mortgage that is not registered with MERS, although the assignment should not 
be recorded.  If the mortgage seller is not going to service the mortgage, the unre-
corded assignment to Fannie Mae must be executed by the servicer.”); Freddie Mac 
eMortgage Guide, FREDDIE MAC, 22.14 (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.freddiemac.com 
/sell/guide/ (“The Seller/Servicer is not required to prepare an assignment of the Secu-
rity Instrument to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac).  
However, Freddie Mac may, at its sole discretion and at any time, require a 
Seller/Servicer, at the Seller/Servicer’s expense, to prepare, execute and/or record 
assignments of the Security Instrument to Freddie Mac.  If an assignment of the Secu-
rity Instrument to Freddie Mac has been prepared, Seller/Servicer must not record it 
unless directed to do so by Freddie Mac.”). 
 79. With securitized residential loans, there is a significant gap between what 
market participants say and what they do.  The typical Pooling and Servicing Agree-
ment, which governs the relationship between the securitized trustee and the deposi-
tor(s) that are providing the mortgages to the pool, requires recording of assignments 
of all of the mortgages.  See, e.g., LONG BEACH SECS. CORP., LONG BEACH MORTG. 
CO. & DEUTSCHE BANK NAT’L TRUST CO., POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT: 
LONG BEACH MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST 2006-3 § 2.01(d) (2006) [hereinafter POOLING 
AND SERVICING AGREEMENT], available at http://content.edgar-online.com/edgar 
_conv_pdf/2006/04/21/0001277277-06-000388_PSALONGBEACH_20063.PDF): 
The Depositor does hereby deliver to, and de-
posit with, the Trustee as custodian . . . the fol-
lowing documents or instruments with respect 
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market investor that delays or omits recording of assignments is taking some 
risk by foregoing the first two benefits mentioned above, but the proportions 
of that risk may seem quite trivial in comparison to the trouble and expense of 
immediate recording.80 
In light of this long-standing practice, a great deal that has been written 
about mortgage assignments is nonsense.  Here is an illustration: 
If borrowers receive a notice in the mail indicating that their mort-
gage has been transferred, they should call their lenders to confirm 
the sale and ask who the mortgage was sold to.  It is also advisable 
to check the records office to confirm that an assignment of the 
mortgage has been followed.81 
This author has expressed a fond wish, but the probability that a bor-
rower could confirm the transfer of the mortgage by checking the public re-
cords is naïve and completely unrealistic.  Another author, condemning the 
impact of MERS on the public records system, wrote: 
When half of the nation’s mortgages are recorded under the name 
of one company [MERS] that does not publish its own records, the 
public’s ability (including both consumers and lenders) to use pub-
  
. . . . 
(d) the original recorded Assignment or As-
signments showing a complete chain of as-
signment from the originator to the Person as-
signing the Mortgage to the Trustee or in blank 
. . . 
In fact, however, the practice of the depositors not recording assignments, and the 
securitized trustees not complaining about it, seems to have been widespread.  See 
David R. Greenberg, Neglected Formalities in the Mortgage Assignment Process and 
the Resulting Effects on Residential Foreclosures, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 253, 253-54 
(2010). 
 80. Moreover, Freddie Mac has all foreclosures performed in its servicers’ 
names, so recording an assignment to the corporation would be wasteful and counter-
productive, since it would simply necessitate another recording to the servicer in the 
event of foreclosure.  FREDDIE MAC SINGLE-FAMILY SELLER/SERVICER GUIDE § 66.17 
(2012), available at http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/.  Its normal procedure, in 
the event of foreclosure, is to record a single assignment from MERS to the servicer, 
or from the originator to the servicer for a non-MERS loan. 
 81. What is an Assignment of a Mortgage?, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD, 
http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/what-is-an-assignment-of-mortgage/ (last visited Jan. 
16, 2013). 
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lic records to evaluate who owns real property interests will inevi-
tably decline.82 
The problem with this statement is that long before MERS was created 
in 1993, the ability to use the public records system to determine who holds 
mortgages was lost, a victim of the widespread decisions of secondary market 
investors not to record mortgage assignments on a current basis.83  
Here is one more illustration, taken from a complaint filed by an Ohio 
county prosecutor against MERS and a large group of mortgage lenders and 
servicers: 
Defendants systematically broke chains of land title throughout 
Ohio counties’ public land records by creating gaps due to missing 
mortgage assignments they failed to record, or by recording pat-
ently false and/or misleading mortgage assignments . . . .  
. . . Defendants’ purposeful failure to record each and every mort-
gage assignment has resulted in far-reaching, devastating conse-
quences for Ohio counties and their public land records – damage 
to public records that may never be entirely remedied.84 
All of the statements quoted above reflect a major misconception con-
cerning the information that the public records system can be expected to 
adduce.  Those records have never been a reliable basis for discovering who 
holds a mortgage loan.  The incentives necessary to induce market partici-
pants to record their ownership of mortgages on a current basis simply do not 
exist, and in any event, evidence of ownership of a mortgage proves nothing 
about holding of the note.  The only way for a borrower to be certain who 
holds his or her note, if it is negotiable, is to demand that the purported holder 
exhibit the original document – a demand that is completely impractical from 
the viewpoint of all parties because the note, if it continues to exist, is proba-
bly in the vault of some remote custodian. 
This is not to say that creation of a system that actually tracks mortgage 
loan ownership and the holding of notes, and provides transparent access to 
that information to the public, would not be desirable.  It is merely to say that 
the real estate recording system does not do, was not designed to do, and can-
  
 82. Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the 
Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 1403 (2010). 
 83. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text. 
 84. Tracey Read, Class Action Suit Filed for Mortgage Records, NEWS-HERALD, 
Oct. 14, 2011, http://www.news-herald.com articles/2011/10/14/news /doc4e985 
23da23be992001503.txt?viewmode=default. 
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not be expected to do that job.85  Criticisms based on the failure of MERS or 
mortgage investors to make it do so are simply silly. 
C.  Transfer of the Note 
As the foregoing discussion shows, the critical thing a secondary market 
mortgage purchaser needs and wants is the note.  Although mortgage assign-
ments have their uses, the mortgage will follow the note and can be fore-
closed by its holder, with or without an assignment.  I have dealt with mort-
gage assignments above in considerable detail, simply because so little that is 
useful has been written about them in the context of the modern secondary 
market.  This is not the case with transfers of notes, so the treatment of notes 
here can be much briefer.  To a great extent, it is covered accurately and thor-
oughly in a report issued by the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform 
Commercial Code in November, 2011,86 (hereafter “the PEB report”), which 
I will rely on heavily here. 
Hence, this section will provide a brief outline of the way U.C.C. Article 
3 impacts mortgage notes.  It will then consider the strange cases in several 
states that seem to disregard Article 3’s requirements in non-judicial foreclo-
sures. 
1.  Summary of Article 3’s Effect on Mortgage Notes 
The legal principles applicable to transfer of a note hinge on one critical 
fact: is the note negotiable or not?  Both Article 3 and Article 9 of the UCC 
apply to notes, but they do not apply to all mortgage notes with equal force.  
Article 9 deals with the way sales and security transfers of notes occur.  It 
governs ownership of notes, as well as security interests in ownership rights.   
It plainly applies to all mortgage notes, whether they are negotiable or not.87 
Article 3, on the other hand, governs not ownership but “entitlement to 
enforce” a note – a quality that certainly sounds as though it is the thing that 
mortgage investors and their servicers want and borrowers need to know 
  
 85. See Patrick Pulatie, Is the Current Recording Process Sufficient for Today’s 
Complex Financial Instruments? Can MERS Resolve the Issues?, ML-EXPLODE.COM 
(Nov. 2002), http://ml-explode.com/2011/11/mers-and-recording-past-present-and-
future-pt-1/ (outlining other deficiencies in the public recording system). 
 86. See PEB REPORT, supra note 21.  For a similar report, reaching virtually 
identical conclusions, see generally AM. SECURITIZATION FORUM, TRANSFER AND 
ASSIGNMENT OF RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE LOANS IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE 
MARKET (2010). 
 87. Article 9 uses the term “instrument,” defined by U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(47) 
(2012) as a document of a “type that in ordinary course of business is transferred by 
delivery with any necessary endorsement or assignment.”  This definition covers all 
promissory notes, irrespective of their negotiability. 
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about88 – and by its terms Article 3 applies only to negotiable notes.89  The 
distinction drawn in the Code between owning a note and being entitled to 
enforce it seems strange at first blush, but it is actually quite useful.  The two 
concepts are distinct, and unfortunately, confusing them has produced a good 
deal of imprecision and nonsense in briefs and judicial opinions.  
Entitlement to enforce a note means that a party can sue on it or (if other 
applicable foreclosure requirements are met) foreclose the mortgage that se-
cures it.  The maker of the note (the mortgagor, in the case of a mortgage 
note) is the party most concerned with who is entitled to enforce the note, for 
the concept is designed to protect the maker against having to pay twice or 
defend against multiple claims on the note.  If the maker pays in full the per-
son entitled to enforce the note, the note is discharged and the mortgage that 
secures it is extinguished.90  Ownership of the note, on the other hand, is a 
concept that deals with who is entitled to the economic fruits of the note – for 
example, who is entitled to the proceeds if it is enforced or collected.91  In the 
mortgage context, one obvious application of the distinction is that servicer of 
a mortgage in a securitized pool might well be entitled to enforce the note (if 
it met the applicable requirements of Article 3), but the trustee of the securi-
tized trust, as owner, would be entitled to have the proceeds of the enforce-
ment action remitted to it.  One court, which got it exactly right, explained as 
follows: 
Under established rules, the maker should be indifferent as to who 
owns or has an interest in the note so long as it does not affect the 
maker’s ability to make payments on the note.  Or, to put this 
statement in the context of this case, the [borrowers] should not 
care who actually owns the Note – and it is thus irrelevant whether 
the Note has been fractionalized or securitized – so long as they do 
know who they should pay.92 
Article 3 says nothing at all about nonnegotiable notes, which are left to 
the common law of contracts.93  This seems simple enough, but it is problem-
  
 88. See, e.g., Armacost v. HSBC Bank, No. 10-CV-274-EJL-LMB, 2011 WL 
825151, at *12 (D. Idaho Feb. 9, 2011) (concluding that foreclosing party was re-
quired to establish its entitlement to enforce the note, irrespective of its holding of an 
assignment of the deed of trust). 
 89. U.C.C. § 3-103(a).  
 90. PEB Report, supra note 21, at 4. 
 91. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements 
for ownership under Article 9). 
 92. Veal v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc. (In re Veal), 450 B.R. 897, 912 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011). 
 93. See, e.g., JPMorgan Chase & Co., Inc. v. Casarano, No. 07 MISC 344419 
(AHS), 2010 WL 3605427, at *6 (Mass. Land Ct. Sept. 16, 2010) (finding a note 
nonnegotiable, and hence governed by the common law, where the note had been lost 
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atic, because it can be extremely difficult to determine with certainty whether 
a note is negotiable or not.  The definition of negotiability is complex and 
technical, and for many mortgage notes, arguments can plausibly be made 
either way.94  The courts often seem to assume that mortgage notes are nego-
tiable and are covered by Article 3, but only rarely do they actually analyze 
the note language to determine whether negotiability exists.  In particular, 
there are few judicial opinions that thoroughly and competently examine the 
negotiability of the standard Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac one-to-four-family 
residential mortgage note, although recent cases that do so seem to be running 
in favor of its negotiability.95 
Hence, it is often unclear which body of law governs mortgage notes – 
Article 3 or the common law.  This is a fundamental structural problem with 
  
and no one could remember whether it was a “demand note” or for a definite term), 
aff’d, 963 N.E.2d 108 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012). 
 94. See U.C.C. § 3-104(a).  I have previously explored the complexities of the 
definition of negotiability, the uncertainty of the classification of many mortgage 
notes, and the tendency of courts to avoid the issue.  See Whitman, How Negotiability 
Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage Market, supra note 3.  A good example of 
the complexity of the determination is Bankers Trust (Delaware) v. 236 Beltway Inv., 
865 F. Supp. 1186 (E.D. Va. 1994), in which the court made an unusually prodigious 
effort but probably got it wrong.  See also Ngo v. Park, 623 S.E.2d 369, 369 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2006) (unpublished table decision) (“[B]ecause separate documents have been 
made a part of the note by its express terms, the promise contained therein is condi-
tional, and the note nonnegotiable”). 
 95. Perhaps the closest opinion to this ideal is HSBC Bank USA v. Gouda, No. 
A-1983-09T2, 2010 WL 5128666, at *3  (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Dec. 17, 2010), 
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1019 (2012), apparently concluding that the clause obligating 
the mortgagor to notify the mortgagee of intent to prepay the loan did not render the 
note nonnegotiable.  The opinion is slightly garbled, but at least the court tried.  One 
federal district court, several bankruptcy courts, and the Alabama intermediate appel-
late court have agreed.  See Picatinny Fed. Credit Union v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 
No. 09-1295 (GEB), 2011 WL 1337507 (D.N.J. Apr. 7, 2011); In re Walker, 466 B.R. 
271, 283-84 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012); Kain v. Bank of New York Mello (In re Kain), 
No. 10-80047-HB, 2012 WL 1098465, at *7-8 (Bankr. D.S.C. Mar. 30, 2012); Ed-
wards v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. (In re Edwards), No. 11-23195, 2011 WL 
6754073, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Dec. 23, 2011); Thomas v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
No. 2101153, 2012 WL 3764729 (Ala. Civ. App. Aug. 31, 2012).  See the discussion 
of this issue in Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage 
Market, supra note 3, at 749-50.  Mesina v. Citibank, NA, No. 10-2304RTL, 2012 WL 
2501123 (Bankr. D.N.J. June 27, 2012) agrees with this analysis, and also holds that 
negotiability was not destroyed by the Fannie Mae-Freddie Mac note’s reference to 
the accompanying mortgage with respect to rights of acceleration and collateral.  But 
see Bank of N.Y. v. Romero, 266 P.3d 638, 644-45 (N.M. Ct. App. 2011) (holding 
that the assignment of the mortgage also assigned the note, a result that would have 
been impossible if the note had been negotiable; but the court made no analysis of the 
negotiability issue), cert. granted, 289 P.3d 1254 (N.M. 2011). 
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the present law that must be dealt with if we are ever to have clarity.96  The 
proposal presented later in this Article will address the point. 
For the moment, let us assume (as the courts usually do) that we are 
dealing with a negotiable note.  If this is the case, the PEB Report clearly 
explains how a party can become entitled to enforce the note.  The methods 
are described here only superficially, and the reader is directed to the PEB 
Report (and Article 3 itself, of course) for the details and relevant citations.  
In brief, there are three ways: 
1.  Becoming a holder.97  This will occur if the note has been delivered 
to and is in the possession of the person enforcing it, with an appropriate en-
dorsement (either in blank – which makes the note a “bearer note,” or spe-
cially – an endorsement that specifically identifies the person to whom the 
note is delivered).  These actions will constitute the person who takes the note 
a “holder,” entitling him or her to enforce the note.98 
2.  Becoming a nonholder who has the rights of a holder.99  This will 
occur if the note has been delivered to and is in the possession of the person 
enforcing it, but without an endorsement.  In the absence of an endorsement, 
the person taking delivery cannot be a holder, but can still get the right of 
enforcement if the delivery was made for the purpose of transferring that 
right.100  
  
 96. This is, in a sense, a weakness of the PEB REPORT, supra note 21.  It spells 
out very clearly the way Article 3 operates on negotiable notes, but it provides no help 
in determining whether Article 3 applies to any particular note, or exactly what rules 
will govern if Article 3 does not. The PEB did not consider clarifying these issues to 
be its responsibility.  See id.  
 97. Id. at 5.  
 98. See In re Walker, 466 B.R. 271, 280-81 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012) (finding note 
was endorsed in blank and delivered to securitized trustee, thus constituting it a 
“holder”); In re David A. Simpson, P.C., 711 S.E.2d 165, 173 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) 
(holding securitized trustee attempting to foreclose was not a “holder,” despite having 
possession of the note, where the note was not endorsed either to the trustee or in 
blank). 
 99. PEB REPORT, supra note 21, at 5. 
 100. See, e.g., Veal v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc. (In re Veal), 450 B.R. 
897, 911-12 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (recognizing “nonholder with the rights of a 
holder” status, but finding that it did not exist in the absence of possession of note); 
Aum Shree of Tampa v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n (In re Aum Shree of Tampa, 
LLC), 449 B.R. 584, 593-94 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) (finding where foreclosing 
party proved possession of the note, it was at least a nonholder with the rights of a 
holder; it was not required to prove that it was a holder in due course); Bank of Am. 
v. Kabba, 276 P.3d 1006, 1009 (Okla. 2012) (“Delivery of the note would still have to 
occur even though there is no negotiation.”); Anderson v. Burson, 35 A.3d 452, 464 
(Md. 2011) (permitting enforcement, where possessor of unendorsed note did not 
prove each prior transfer, but makers conceded that such transfers had occurred); 
Leyva v. Nat’l Default Servicing Corp., 255 P.3d 1275, 1281 (Nev. 2011) (requiring 
the servicer to provide specific, affirmative proof that the note was delivered to it for 
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3.  Providing a “lost note affidavit.” Under section 3-309, a person who 
does not qualify to enforce the note under (1) or (2) above because of a lack 
of possession may still enforce it by providing a “lost note affidavit.”101  
However, the requirements for the affidavit are quite strict: the note must 
have been destroyed, its whereabouts not discoverable, or it must be in the 
wrongful possession of an unknown person or one who cannot be served.  
Before accepting such an affidavit, a court might well demand evidence as to 
the efforts that have been made to locate the note.  In addition, the court can 
require the enforcing party to provide assurance (typically in the form of a 
bond) against the possibility that the borrower will have to pay twice.102  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have developed careful procedures for 
maintaining custody of mortgage notes,103 and lost notes are rare for loans 
they hold.  But other secondary market investors have not been so scrupulous, 
and it is all too common in foreclosure cases that neither the investor nor a 
custodian designated by it has possession of the note.  Hence the lost note 
affidavit procedure is extremely important.104  There is little doubt that in 
  
the purpose of transferring the right of enforcement); Wells Fargo Bank v. Ford, 15 
A.3d 327, 331 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011) (finding documents proving purpose 
for which note was delivered were not properly authenticated).  But cf. In re Adams, 
693 S.E.2d 705 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (refusing to allow foreclosure by the party in 
possession of the note, apparently because it was not endorsed). 
 101. See, e.g., Allen v. US Bank Nat’l Ass’n (In re Allen), 472 B.R. 559 (B.A.P. 
9th Cir. 2012) (holding lost note affidavit sufficient to sustain noteholder’s claim in 
bankruptcy); Bobby D. Assocs. v. DiMarcantonio, 751 A.2d 673, 675-76 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 2000) (finding assignee of lost note may enforce it through lost note affidavit).  If 
the original note is lost and no photocopies of it can be found, a lost note affidavit 
may be insufficient for purposes of enforcement, because it may be impossible to 
determine the terms of the original note.  See JPMorgan Chase & Co. v. Casarano, 
963 N.E.2d 108, 110-11 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012). 
 102. See, e.g., First Const. Co. v. Tri-S. Mortg. Investors, 308 N.W.2d 298, 299 
(Minn. 1981).   
 103. See FANNIE MAE, REQUIREMENTS FOR DOCUMENT CUSTODIANS (2009); 
FREDDIE MAC, DOCUMENT CUSTODY PROCEDURES HANDBOOK (2012). 
 104. The need for such affidavits appears to be widespread, since in some areas of 
the nation original notes were routinely destroyed as a matter of policy.  For example, 
a letter to the Florida Supreme Court from the Florida Bankers Association in 2009 
observed, “[t]he reason ‘many firms file lost note counts as a standard alternative 
pleading in the complaint’ is because the physical document was deliberately elimi-
nated to avoid confusion immediately upon its conversion to an electronic file.”  Yves 
Smith, FUBAR Mortgage Behavior: Florida Banks Destroyed Notes; Others Never 
Transferred Them, NAKED CAPITALISM (Sept. 27, 2010),  http://www 
.nakedcapitalism.com/2010/09/more-evidence-of-bank-fubar-mortgage-behavior-
florida-banks-destroyed-notes-others-never-transferred-them.html.  It is not clear to 
what extent notes were destroyed, but it seems obvious that in many cases the lost 
note affidavit process has been employed simply to avoid the trouble of looking for 
the note.  One Florida legal aid attorney estimated that 80% of the foreclosure com-
plaints in his locality were accompanied by lost note affidavits.  Bob Ivry, Banks Lose 
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some sections of the country it has been the subject of serious abuse, with 
foreclosing parties using it not because the original note was impossible to 
find, but merely because it was inconvenient.  Prior to the 2002 amendments 
to section 3-309, some courts took the view that the party attempting to en-
force the note had to aver that it lost the note itself; a loss of the note by its 
predecessor (for example, the originator of the note) would not count.105  This 
narrow interpretation of section 3-309 was expanded by the 2002 amend-
ments to Article 3, the current version of which allows a person to enforce the 
note if he or she “has directly or indirectly acquired ownership of the instru-
ment from a person who was entitled to enforce the instrument when loss of 
possession occurred.”106   But the 2002 amendments have been adopted in 
only ten states, so in much of the nation a secondary market investor may still 
be in serious trouble if the note was lost or destroyed by its predecessor.107 
To return to the first two methods of becoming “entitled to enforce” de-
scribed above, while they require that the enforcing party possess the note,108 
they do not literally insist that the note be produced in court.  Conceivably, 
the foreclosing party could prove that it had possession of the note by other 
means, such as oral testimony or affidavits.109 But one can easily see why 
  
to Deadbeat Homeowners as Loans Sold in Bonds Vanish, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 22, 
2008), www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aejJZdqodTCM . 
 105. See, e.g., Dennis Joslin Co. v. Robinson Broad. Corp, 977 F. Supp. 491, 494-
95 (D.D.C. 1997).  The situation is well explained in Timothy R. Zinnecker, Extend-
ing Enforcement Rights to Assignees of Lost, Destroyed, or Stolen Negotiable Instru-
ments Under U.C.C. Article 3: A Proposal for Reform, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 111 
(2001). 
 106. U.C.C. § 3-309(a)(1)(B) (2012); see Feltus v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 80 So. 
3d 375, 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (holding that even under 2002 amendment to 
U.C.C. § 3-309, complaint was insufficient because it failed to allege that alleged 
owner of note “‘was entitled to enforce the instrument when loss of possession oc-
curred, or has directly or indirectly acquired ownership of the instrument from a per-
son who was entitled to enforce the instrument when loss of possession occurred’” 
(quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 673.3091(a) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.))). 
 107. Compare State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lord, 851 So. 2d 790, 791 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2003) (holding under prior version of Article 3, mortgagee must prove it had 
possession of the note when it was lost or destroyed), with EquiCredit Corp. v. Provo, 
No. L-03-1217, 2006 WL 2192856 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2006) (finding mortgagee 
provided satisfactory proof that it was in possession of note at the time it was lost). 
 108. See, e.g., HSBC Bank v. Hernandez, 939 N.Y.S.2d 120, 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2012) (denying foreclosure where foreclosing party did not prove it had possession of 
note). 
 109. See, e.g., Howard v. PNC Mortg., 269 P.3d 995, 997 (Utah Ct. App. 2012) 
(correctly accepting photocopy of note as proof of its possession, where mortgagor 
admitted note had been transferred and photocopy showed that it had been properly 
endorsed). 
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courts in judicial foreclosure states often demand that the note itself be pro-
duced; if you have the note, why not show it to the judge?110  
2.  Non-judicial Foreclosure Decisions that Disregard Article 3 
In states where non-judicial foreclosure is used, the situation becomes 
more complex.  There is no judge to show the note to, unless a suit is filed to 
enjoin or set aside the foreclosure.  If the security instrument is a deed of trust 
and a trustee conducts the foreclosure, one might assume that the trustee 
should, at a minimum, determine whether the note is negotiable (perhaps by 
reviewing a photocopy), and if it is, demand to see the original document or a 
lost note affidavit.  In reality, it is doubtful that this inspection occurs on any 
regular basis, although I am aware of no evidence on the point.111 
In light of the discussion of UCC Article 3 requirements discussed 
above, it may seem perfectly obvious that only a party who is “entitled to 
enforce” a negotiable note can foreclose the deed of trust that secures it.  Af-
ter all, what could be a plainer example of enforcing a note than a proceeding 
to foreclose the security attached to it?  This view is routine in judicial fore-
closures, and in non-judicial proceedings as well in some states.112  Yet rather 
remarkably, a large number of federal courts dealing with non-judicial deed 
of trust foreclosures from 2007 to 2012 in Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Nevada, Virginia, and Texas have held the contrary: no one – neither the trus-
  
 110. See, e.g., 5-Star Mgmt., Inc. v. Rogers, 940 F. Supp. 512, 520-21 (E.D.N.Y. 
1996); In re Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 392 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2009) (having a mortgage as-
signment from MERS is no substitute for delivery of the note).  Even if the note is 
nonnegotiable, a court may demand production of it as proof that it has been trans-
ferred to the party that filed the foreclosure action.  This idea is an ancient one, not 
confined to negotiable notes. See, e.g., Sheehy v. Mandeville, 11 U.S. 208 (1812) 
(Marshall, J.) (“The practice of this country is to require that the note should be pro-
duced, or its absence accounted for, and the rule is a safe one.”). 
 111. Some such procedure seems to be demanded by North Carolina law. N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(c)(7)(d) (Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (requiring that the 
clerk of court, prior to authorizing foreclosure of a deed of trust, find from evidence 
submitted by the trustee, “the existence of: (i) valid debt of which the party seeking to 
foreclose is the holder”); see In re David A. Simpson, P.C., 711 S.E.2d 165 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2011) (determining that the required showing was not made). 
 112. See, e.g., In re Lacey, 480 B.R. 13, 34 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) (holding that 
to foreclose under Massachusetts non-judicial procedure, party must either hold the 
note or be the agent of the note-holder); Bank of N.Y. v. Raftogianis, 13 A.3d 435, 
438 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2010) (“[A] party seeking to foreclose a mortgage must 
own or control the underlying debt”); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Baber, 280 P.3d 956, 
959 (Okla. 2012) (“It is a fundamental precept of the law to expect a foreclosing party 
to actually be in possession of its claimed interest in the note”); U.S. Bank Nat’l 
Ass’n v. Kimball, 27 A.3d 1087, 1094 (Vt. 2011) (“It is neither irrational nor wasteful 
to expect a foreclosing party to actually be in possession of its claimed interest in the 
note”). 
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tee conducting the foreclosure sale nor a court reviewing the foreclosure – 
need be satisfied that that the party instituting the foreclosure holds the 
note!113  One federal judge in Idaho disagreed and required compliance with 
Article 3, distinguishing the other federal cases on the sketchy ground that 
they deal with the foreclosure procedure, but not with the foreclosing party’s 
right to initiate that procedure.114 
Four state appellate court decisions on this point have come down dur-
ing late 2011 and 2012, and they largely agree with the federal cases men-
tioned above that disregard Article 3.  In the first, Residential Funding Co. v. 
Saurman, the Michigan Supreme Court held that MERS, as holder of a mort-
gage in the capacity of nominee for the noteholder, could foreclose in its own 
name despite not holding the note.115  The reasoning of the opinion is aston-
ishingly garbled: 
[A]s record-holder of the mortgage, MERS owned a security lien 
on the properties, the continued existence of which was contingent 
upon the satisfaction of the indebtedness.  This interest in the in-
  
 113. Pascual v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. 10-00759 JMS-KSC, 2012 WL 
3583530, at *3 (D. Haw. Aug. 20, 2012); Palmerin v. Bank of N.Y. Trust Co., 2012 
WL 393650, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2012) (citing additional cases); Meyer v. Bank of 
Am., No. 1:10-cv-00632-EJL, 2011 WL 4584514, at *5 (D. Idaho Aug. 29, 2011); In 
re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. (MERS) Litigation, No. 09-2119-JAT, 2011 WL 
251453, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jan. 25, 2011) (applying Nevada law); Gallant v. Deutsche 
Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 766 F. Supp. 2d 714, 720-21 (W.D. Va. 2011); Kan v. OneWest 
Bank, FSB, 823 F. Supp. 2d 464, 470 (W.D. Tex. 2011); Mansour v. Cal-Western 
Reconveyance Corp., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1181-82 (D. Ariz. 2009); Diessner v. 
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 618 F. Supp. 2d 1184, 1187 (D. Ariz. 2009), aff’d, 384 
F. App’x 609 (9th Cir. 2010); Urbina v. Homeview Lending Inc., 681 F. Supp. 2d 
1254, 1257-58 (D. Nev. 2009); Wayne v. HomEq Servicing, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-00781-
RCJ-LRL, 2008 WL 4642595, at *3-4 (D. Nev. Oct. 16, 2008); Neal v. Juarez, No. 
06CV0055 J(JMA), 2007 WL 2140640, at *8 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2007) (“[T]he alle-
gation that the trustee did not have the original note or had not received it is insuffi-
cient to render the foreclosure proceeding invalid.”), aff’d, 301 F. App’x 683 (9th Cir. 
2008).  Minnesota apparently agrees under its “foreclosure by advertisement” proce-
dure.  See Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 770 N.W.2d 487, 501 
(Minn. 2009); Stein v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 662 F.3d 976, 980 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(“[T]he right to enforce a mortgage through foreclosure by advertisement lies with the 
legal, rather than equitable, holder of the mortgage.  The assignment of the promis-
sory note to another ‘operates as an equitable assignment of the underlying [mort-
gage],’ but the right to enforce the mortgage remains with the legal holder of the 
mortgage.” (emphasis omitted) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Jackson, 770 
N.W.2d at 497)); cf. Veal v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc. (In re Veal), 450 B.R. 
897, 917-18 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (holding a mortgage lender seeking stay relief in 
bankruptcy must establish its standing by proof that it holds the note). 
 114. Armacost v. HSBC Bank USA, No.10-CV-274-EJL-LMB, 2011 WL 
825151, at *10 (D. Idaho Feb. 9, 2011).  
 115. 805 N.W.2d 183, 184 (Mich. 2011). 
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debtedness – i.e., the ownership of legal title to a security lien 
whose existence is wholly contingent on the satisfaction of the in-
debtedness – authorized MERS to foreclose by advertisement un-
der MCL 600.3204(1)(d).116 
It is clear that the court intended to uphold MERS-name foreclosures, 
and was willing to engage in certain amount of verbal nonsense in order to do 
so.  In any event, the net result is that an assignee of the mortgage need not 
show that it holds the note to foreclose non-judicially in Michigan.117  The 
decision betrays no awareness whatever of the demands of UCC Article 3. 
In Hogan v. Washington Mutual Bank,118 the Arizona Supreme Court 
held that “the deed of trust statutes impose no obligation on the beneficiary to 
‘show the note’ before the trustee conducts a non-judicial foreclosure.”119  
While this may seem to ignore the requirements of UCC Article 3, “[t]he trust 
deed statutes do not require compliance with the UCC before a trustee com-
mences a non-judicial foreclosure.”120  These statements may seem extreme, 
but perhaps they are only about the burden of going forward with evidence.  
The court pointed out that the borrower “has not alleged that [the lenders] are 
not entitled to enforce the underlying note; rather, he alleges that they have 
the burden of demonstrating their rights before a non-judicial foreclosure may 
proceed.  Nothing in the non-judicial foreclosure statutes, however, imposes 
such an obligation.”121  Suppose the borrower had alleged in the complaint 
that the assignee of the deed of trust lacked possession of the note;122 would 
the court have compelled the assignee to produce it?  Of course, if this is the 
court’s position it seems nonsensical; it effectively requires the borrower to 
bring a lawsuit in order to make such an allegation, and then places the bur-
den of producing evidence as to possession of the note on the borrower – the 
  
 116. Id. at 183. 
 117. See Hargrow v. Wells Fargo Bank, No. 11-1806, 2012 WL 2552805, at *3 
(6th Cir. July 3, 2012) (adopting this understanding of Saurman). 
 118. 277 P.3d 781 (Ariz. 2012). 
 119. Id. at 783. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Would such an allegation, based on nothing more than suspicion, be im-
proper or sanctionable in Arizona?  Arizona’s version of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Rule 11, is violated “by the filing of a pleading when the party or counsel 
knew, or should have known by such investigation of fact and law as was reasonable 
and feasible under all the circumstances that the claim or defense was insubstantial, 
groundless, frivolous or otherwise unjustified.”  Gilbert v. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 745 
P.2d 617, 631 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (internal emphasis omitted), superseded by stat-
ute on other grounds, as stated in Pierce v. Laydon Leasing, Inc., No. 1 CA-CV 10-
0250, 2011 WL 1631931 (Ariz. Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2011).   But what sort of investiga-
tion can the plaintiff or his counsel make?  Is simply asking the foreclosing party 
whether it has the original note likely to do any good?  It seems probable that such a 
request would be ignored. 
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party least likely to have any information or knowledge on the subject.  The 
court’s handling of this issue is, to put it mildly, unsatisfactory. 
The Idaho Supreme Court took a far more radical view of a trustee’s 
power to foreclose a deed of trust in Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon.123  
The borrower asserted that the foreclosing party (the trustee of a securitized 
trust) was obliged to establish its standing to foreclose by proving that it held 
the loan.124  The court was unimpressed;  
 
nothing in the text of the statute can reasonably be read to require 
the trustee [of a deed of trust] to prove it has ‘standing’ before 
foreclosing.  Instead, the plain language of the statute makes it 
clear that the trustee may foreclose on a deed of trust if it complies 
with the requirements contained within the Act.”125   
 
The Act, in turn, has only five requirements: (1) any assignments of the deed 
of trust or substitutions of trustee has been recorded, (2) there is a default by 
the borrower, (3) an appropriate notice of default has been recorded, (4) no 
suit on the debt is pending, and (5) a notice of sale has been given to the 
proper parties.126  Taking literally the bare-bones nature of these require-
ments, the court reached a truly bizarre conclusion: “a trustee may initiate 
non-judicial foreclosure proceedings on a deed of trust without first proving 
ownership of the underlying note or demonstrating that the deed of trust bene-
ficiary has requested or authorized the trustee to initiate those proceed-
ings.”127 
Finally, in Debrunner v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co.,128 the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal fully endorsed the federal cases mentioned above that 
construe California law.  Quoting earlier California authority holding that the 
foreclosure statute sets forth “a comprehensive framework for the regulation 
of a non-judicial foreclosure sale pursuant to a power of sale contained in a 
deed of trust,”129 the court explicitly rejected the notion that the “person enti-
tled to enforce” provisions of UCC Article 3 played any role in establishing 
the right to foreclose.130  “[W]e are not convinced,” the court said, “that the 
cited sections of the Commercial Code (particularly section 3301) displace 
  
 123. 275 P.3d 857 (Idaho 2012). 
 124. Id. at 861.  
 125. Id. at 862. 
 126. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 45-1505, 45-1506 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 127. Trotter, 275 P.3d at 862. 
 128. 138 Cal. Rptr. 3d 830 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012). 
 129. Id. at 835 (quoting Moeller v. Lien, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 777, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1994)). 
 130. Id. at 835-36. 
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the detailed, specific, and comprehensive set of legislative procedures the 
Legislature has established for non-judicial foreclosures.”131 
Most of the remaining state courts in non-judicial foreclosure jurisdic-
tions have thus far generally remained silent on the point, and a few have 
taken the opposite approach, reading their statutes to require possession of the 
note.132  But the decisions discussed above, both federal and state, are ex-
tremely troublesome.  They either completely ignore UCC Article 3 or give it 
very short shrift; in effect, they seem to hold that the state’s foreclosure stat-
utes supersede the Uniform Commercial Code, although most of them do not 
analyze that issue in any rigorous manner.  In essence they rely on the literal 
language of the foreclosure statutes, and assume that no requirement found 
anywhere else in the state’s codes is relevant. 
In addition to the issue of standing to foreclose discussed above, the 
“lost note” problem mentioned earlier assumes a very different cast in non-
judicial foreclosure states.  There is no court to which the lender or benefici-
ary of the deed of trust can present the affidavit, nor any mechanism in most 
non-judicial foreclosure jurisdictions for requiring the posting of a bond by 
the lender to protect the borrower against having to pay twice.133  The effect 
is to render the “adequate protection” provisions of UCC 3-309 meaningless 
unless the borrower is willing to file a lawsuit. 
  
 131. Id. at 836. 
 132. See In re Allen, 472 B.R. 559, 569 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2012) (construing the 
Washington non-judicial foreclosure statute to require possession of the note by not-
ing that “an assignment of the DOT is not relevant because under Washington law, 
the security for an obligation follows the debt.  RCW 61.24.005(2) (‘Beneficiary’ 
means the holder of the instrument or document evidencing the obligations secured by 
the deed of trust . . .)”); Ball v. Bank of New York, No. 4:12–CV–00144–NKL, 2012 
WL 6645695  (W.D. Mo. 2012) (under Missouri law, foreclosing party must possess 
the note); Anderson v. Burson, 35 A.3d 452, 460 (Md. 2011) (holding Maryland law 
requires possession of the note for use of statutory foreclosure procedure); Eaton v. 
Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 969 N.E.2d 1118, 1129 (Mass. 2012) (“[W]e construe the 
term ‘mortgagee’ in [the non-judicial foreclosure statute] to mean a mortgagee who 
also holds the underlying mortgage note.”); In re David A. Simpson, P.C., 711 S.E.2d 
165 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (denying statutory foreclosure, where foreclosing party did 
not prove it was holder of the note). 
 133. Virginia is an exception. Under VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59.1(B) (West, West-
law through 2012 Spec. Sess.) the trustee of the deed of trust must obtain the lost note 
affidavit from the lender as a prerequisite to foreclosure (if the lender cannot exhibit 
the note), and must notify the borrower, advising the borrower that she or he may 
petition the circuit court for an order requiring a bond or other protection.  The statute 
implies, but does not explicitly state, that the trustee should begin this process by 
demanding to see the note.  See id.  Ironically, a Virginia federal court construed this 
language in exactly the opposite way – as evidence that, because  the note might not 
be available, the foreclosing beneficiary has no duty to show possession of the note.  
See Gallant v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 766 F. Supp. 2d 714, 721 (W.D. Va. 
2011). 
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3.  Conclusion: The Sad State of the Law of Secondary Market Note 
Transfers 
In summary, the American legal system handles secondary market 
trades of mortgage loans in an almost unbelievably inept manner.  It is often 
difficult or impossible to tell what set of rules govern transactions, given the 
complexities of the definition of negotiability.134  If the note is negotiable, the 
right of enforcement depends on keeping track of the original physical docu-
ment, which may easily be lost, mislaid, or intentionally destroyed.135  Market 
institutions and some state statutes may put reliance on mortgage assign-
ments, but that reliance is generally misplaced, in the sense that assignments 
prove little or nothing about the right of enforcement.136  In a number of non-
judicial foreclosure states, the rules for foreclosure of security instruments 
and those for determining the right of enforcement of notes seem to operate 
on different planets, completely inconsistent with each other.137  Litigation on 
all of these issues is rampant.  On the whole, it is an appalling mess, com-
pletely unsuited for the large-scale secondary mortgage market that exists 
today. 
D.  The Cost of Following the Rules. 
Assume for a moment that you are responsible for the operations of a 
secondary mortgage market participant, and you hold a package of loans that 
you wish to sell to another investor.  Moreover, assume that you are deter-
mined to do things right; that is, notwithstanding the legal vagaries mentioned 
above, you are going to provide endorsed notes and recorded assignments for 
each loan to your purchaser – surely the most conservative position for both 
seller and purchaser.  Consider the steps you need to take: 
1. Determine to which of approximately 3,600 recording jurisdic-
tions in the United States the assignment must be sent for recorda-
tion. (In several New England states the records are organized on a 
town, rather than a county basis.) 
2. Determine the applicable document standards (margins, font, 
addresses, cover sheet, etc.) imposed by the recording office of the 
jurisdiction. 
3. Prepare, execute, and acknowledge the assignment of the mort-
gage.  Note that the assignment must be hand tailored to the spe-
  
 134. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra notes 57-71 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra notes 114-35 and accompanying text.   
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cific mortgage, since the original parties, recording information, 
and land description must be recited.  Do not forget the notariza-
tion! 
4. Determine the jurisdiction’s fee schedule and calculate the cor-
rect recording fee. 
5. Write a check for the fee. 
6. Transmit the assignment for recording, along with the fee. 
7. Locate the original wet-ink signed promissory note, likely stored 
in an off-site vault. 
8. Endorse the note to the transferee, including a hand-written sig-
nature.  If there is insufficient space on the note, it will be neces-
sary to attach an allonge to the note and write the endorsement on 
it. 
9. Physically transmit the note to the transferee. 
10. Ensure that the original assignment is forwarded to the trans-
feree after recording.  The recording office may perform this serv-
ice. 
The payment of fees to local recorders is a particular burden.  Every ju-
risdiction has its own fee schedule.  Fees are constantly being revised, and in 
all events are usually based on the number of pages to be recorded.  The party 
submitting the document must count the pages, and the recorder’s personnel 
will count them again.  If the fee is incorrect, the document will be returned 
to the sender without recording and the whole procedure will begin again.  
Considered at a national scale, the system for payment of recording fees is, by 
itself, almost insanely inefficient. 
The overall process is, to put it mildly, cumbersome.  None of the steps 
are impossible or extremely difficult, but in the aggregate they represent a 
very substantial cost, and there are no “traffic cops” to insist that the steps are 
performed.  The system may have been reasonably acceptable to the mort-
gage industry when volumes of secondary market transactions were relatively 
low.  During the late 1990s and early 2000s, when volumes of secondary 
market trades increased greatly as a result of widespread securitization, play-
ers in the industry frequently simply quit playing by these rules.  Promissory 
notes were retained by originators, and often lost or perhaps even shredded.  
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Assignments were not prepared or executed.  The system bogged down under 
its own weight.138 
II.  THE ADVENT AND FALLACIES OF MERS. 
In 1993, the principal actors in the secondary mortgage market139 came 
together to form the Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS).  They 
were motivated by the increased volumes of secondary market trades and the 
likelihood that they would grow far greater in number as securitization of 
residential mortgages became more common.  
MERS was designed to eliminate the need for successive recording of 
assignments as a mortgage loan was transferred from one owner to another in 
the secondary market.  A loan is entered into the system either by making 
MERS the original mortgagee (as nominee for the note holder), or by record-
ing an assignment of the original mortgage to MERS immediately after it is 
originated.  Thereafter, no assignments are recorded to reflect further sales of 
the loan; instead, market participants simply report subsequent loan sales to 
MERS electronically, and MERS maintains a computer database of the re-
ported information.  When the mortgage is paid off, a person who is purport-
edly a MERS officer (but who is employed by the mortgage servicer) exe-
cutes a release to the borrower.  Under the original plan, if the mortgage 
needed to be foreclosed, MERS would execute and record an assignment to 
the note holder or its servicer, which in turn would conduct the foreclosure. 
Initially, market participants were enthusiastic about MERS’ services, 
and by 2000, the majority of residential mortgages originated in the United 
States were being registered with MERS.140  The only significant objections 
came from local real estate recording officials, who were angered that MERS 
had eliminated the revenues they had previously collected for recording 
  
 138. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Audit Uncovers Extensive Flaws in Foreclo-
sures, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/16/business/ 
california-audit-finds-broad-irregularities-in-foreclosures.html?_r=1&nl= todayshead-
lines&emc=tha2 (reporting an audit of 400 recent foreclosures in San Francisco, and 
disclosing multiple errors with mortgage assignments); Gretchen Morgenson, Flawed 
Paperwork Aggravates a Foreclosure Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/04/business/04mortgage.html?pagewanted=all. 
 139. Founders included Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Government National 
Mortgage Association, the Mortgage Bankers Association, and a variety of other 
industry participants. 
 140. See Carson Mullen, MERS: Tracking Loans Electronically, MORTGAGE 
BANKING, May 2000, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/MERS 
%3A+Tracking+Loans+Electronically.-a063975145.  MERS currently estimates that 
60% of U.S. mortgages are registered with it.  See Michael Powell & Gretchen 
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mortgage assignments.  The Suffolk County, New York, Clerk of Court took 
the radical step of refusing to record mortgages or assignments to MERS, but 
was ultimately ordered to do so by the New York Court of Appeals.141  Some 
commentators have continued to maintain that MERS should be held liable 
for the lost recording fees,142 and several recorders have filed suits to recover 
lost fees,143 but these claims seem both forlorn and absurd.144  They disregard 
a fundamental premise of the American recording system – that no one has 
any obligation to record anything.145 
In terms of market participation, MERS has been highly successful.  At 
the same time, it has become bogged down in seemingly endless litigation, 
and is so widely castigated on internet blogs that one reading them would 
conclude MERS is at best illegal and a principal cause of the foreclosure cri-
sis of the late 2000s,146 and at worst a satanic threat to the American way of 
  
 141. MERSCORP v. Romaine, 861 N.E.2d 81, 82-83 (N.Y. 2006). 
 142. See Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Elec-
tronic Registration System’s Land Title Theory, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 111, 143-55 
(2011). 
 143. See David Dayen, Dallas County Sues MERS for Unpaid Recording Fees, 
FIRE DOG LAKE (Sept. 23, 2011), http://news.firedoglake.com/2011/09/23/dallas-
county-sues-mers-for-unpaid-recording-fees/; Bexar County Will Sue MERS over 
Unpaid Fees, TEX. FORECLOSURE DEFENSE NETWORK (Oct. 26, 2011), 
http://www.texasforeclosuredefensenetwork.com/san-antonio/2011/10/26/bexar-
county-will-sue-mers-over-unpaid-fees/; Broke Counties Go After Banks and MERS 
for Filing Fees, SANDHILLS N.C., http://www.sandhillsnc.com/broke-counties-go-
after-banks-and-mers-for-filing-fees.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).  
 144. See Brown v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 6:11-CV-06070, 2012 
WL 5416922 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 17, 2012) (holding that county clerks had no standing 
to claim loss of revenue due to absence of recordings under MERS system or to re-
quire recordings of mortgage assignments); Christian Cnty. Clerk ex rel. Kem v. 
Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 5:11CV-00072-M, 2012 WL 566807 (W.D. 
Ky. Feb. 21, 2012) (same). 
 145. Unrecorded conveyances are entirely valid as between the parties.  The in-
centive for a grantee to record a conveyance arises from the possibility that, absent 
recording, the grantor will later make a conflicting conveyance to a bona fide pur-
chaser, who will prevail over the first grantee.  See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home 
Loans, Inc., No. CV 09-517-PHXJATLEAD, 2009 WL 3157160, at *11 (D. Ariz. 
Sept. 24, 2009) (“Any lack of notice in the public records, however, to future buyers 
of Plaintiffs’ mortgages does not alter Plaintiffs’ obligations under the mortgages”), 
aff’d, 656 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011); STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, PROPERTY, supra note 
16, § 11.9. 
 146. In late 2011 and early 2012 the Attorneys General of New York, Massachu-
setts, and Delaware sued several large banks and MERS, asserting that the MERS 
record-keeping system is illegal and fraudulent.  See Gretchen Morgenson, Massa-
chusetts Sues 5 Major Banks over Foreclosure Practices, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 1, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/02/business/major-banks-face-new-foreclosure-
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life.147  What went wrong to cause these enormous legal and public relations 
problems for MERS? There are many answers, but the material below will 
outline six of the principal issues that have plagued MERS. 
A.  A Weak Legal Foundation 
MERS was founded as an ordinary Delaware stock corporation, with no 
special statutory basis for its existence.148  It has no preemptive authority over 
existing mortgage or commercial law, and instead was designed to operate 
within the framework of pre-existing law.  The architects of MERS elected to 
characterize it as a “nominee” for the actual holders of the loans.  The use of 
nominees in commercial transactions is not unusual;149 for example, brokers 
often hold shares of stock in a “street name” as nominee for the actual inves-
tor.150  Nevertheless, the concept was apparently generally unfamiliar and 
confusing to judges.  This fact gave foreclosure defense lawyers an opening 
wedge.  They filed a multitude of suits attacking MERS’ operations, often 
arguing that as a nominee, MERS had no authority to execute assignments or 
  
mortgage-database.html; Complaint, Delaware v. Merscorp Inc. Go Go Beau!, 
DEADLY CLEAR BLOG (Oct. 28, 2011), http://deadlyclear.wordpress.com/2011 
/10/28/complaint-state-of-delaware-v-merscorp-inc-go-go-beau/.  The principal aca-
demic critic of MERS has been Professor Christopher Peterson.  See Peterson, supra 
note 82; see also Ariana Eunjung Cha, Banks’ Legal Right to Foreclose Is Questioned 
in Testimony Before House Panel, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2010, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/02/AR20101202052 
24.htmls. 
 147. See, e.g., Bombshell MERS Ruling: Process Illegal, DAILY KOS (Feb. 14, 
2011, 1:50 PM), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2011/02/14/944523/-Bombshell-
MERS-Ruling:Process-Illegal; Ellen Brown, Homeowners’ Rebellion: Could 62 Mil-
lion Homes Be Foreclosure-Proof?, YES! MAGAZINE, Aug. 18, 2010, 
http://www.yesmagazine.org/new-economy/homeowners-rebellion-could-62-million-
homes-be-foreclosure-proof; Yasha Levine, How an Obscure Outfit Called MERS Is 
Subverting our Entire System of Property Rights, ALTERNET (Dec. 15, 2010), 
http://www.alta.org/news/news.cfm?newsID=16630; Scott J. Paltrow, Life on MERS: 
Archive Is at Center of Mortgage Mess, 4CLOSURE FRAUD (July 19, 2011), 
http://4closurefraud.org/2011/07/19/life-on-mers-archive-is-at-center-of-mortgage-
mess/; L. Randall Wray, Anatomy of Mortgage Fraud, Part I: MERS’s Smoking Gun, 
HUFFPOST BUSINESS BLOG (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/l-randall-
wray/merss-smoking-gun-part-1-_b_794713.html. 
 148. MERS’ principal owners are the Mortgage Bankers Association, Fannie 
Mae, Freddie Mac, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase Bank, HSBC Bank, CitiMort-
gage, GMAC Bank, the American Land Title Association, and Wells Fargo Bank. 
 149. See, e.g., Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 467, 479 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2011) (“A ‘nominee’ is a person or entity designated to act for another in a lim-
ited role – in effect, an agent.”). 
 150. See, e.g., Smith v. Kisorin USA, Inc., 254 P.3d 636, 638 (Nev. 2011) (“[T]he 
beneficial holder of stock holds equitable title to the stock that is registered under the 
holder in street name.”). 
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appoint substitute trustees151 on behalf of the beneficial owner.  After several 
significant initial losses,152 MERS began to win these cases quite consis-
tently,153 and the issue has now died down considerably. 
B.  Separation of Mortgage from Note  
When MERS was created, a decision was made that MERS would hold 
only the mortgage, but not the associated promissory note.  In light of the 
complexity and legal liability associated with storing and tracking many mil-
lions of notes,154 this decision was entirely understandable; the administrative 
burdens of acting as custodians of the notes would have been huge.  But this 
decision had the unfortunate result of giving rise to countless arguments 
about the apparent separation of the note from the mortgage, and about the 
extent to which a transfer of the mortgage would transfer the note, and vice 
versa.  As with the suits based on MERS’ supposed lack of authority to exe-
cute valid assignments, these cases have nearly all been ultimately resolved in 
MERS’s favor,155 but they have also imposed a huge litigation burden. 
  
 151. See, e.g., Groseth v. Madison (In re Madison), No. 2:09BK-22225-PHX, 
2010 WL 3941858 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Oct. 4, 2010). 
 152. In re Agard, 444 B.R. 231 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated in part sub nom. 
Agard v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., No. BR 8-10-77338 REG, 2012 WL 
1043690 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2012); Bellistri v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 284 
S.W.3d 619 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009); Bank of N.Y. v. Alderazi, 900 N.Y.S.2d 821 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010). 
 153. See In re Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. (MERS) Litigation, No. MDL 09-
2119-JAT, 2011 WL 4550189 (D. Ariz. Oct. 3, 2011); Velasco v. Sec. Nat’l Mortg. 
Co., 823 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (D. Haw. 2011); Smith v. Cmty. Lending, Inc., 773 F. 
Supp. 2d 941 (D. Nev. 2011); In re Lozez, 446 B.R. 12 (Bankr. E.D. Mass. 2011); 
Rogan v. Citimortgage (In re Jessup), 72 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 876 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 
2010); Crum v. LaSalle Bank, 55 So. 3d 266 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009); Peace v. Mortg. 
Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., No. 4:09CV00966 SWW, 2010 WL 2384263 (E.D. Ark. 
2010); US Bank v. Flynn, 897 N.Y.S.2d 855 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010); Deutsche Bank 
Nat’l Trust Co. v. Traxler, No. 09CA009739, 2010 WL 3294292 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 
23, 2010). 
 154. The total number of mortgages current registered with MERS is usually 
estimated at more than 60 million.  See Powell & Morgenson, supra note 140.  
 155. Cases rejecting arguments based on separation of the mortgage and note 
include King v. Am. Mortg. Network, Inc., No. 1:09CV162 DAK, 2010 WL 3516475 
(D. Utah Sept. 2, 2010); Nicholson v. OneWest Bank, No. 1:10-CV-0795-JEC/AJB, 
2010 WL 2732325 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2010); Bank of N.Y. v. Raftogianis, 13 A.3d 
435 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2010); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Pietranico, 928 
N.Y.S.2d 818 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011). 
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C.  Use of Multiple “Corporate Officers”  
It would have been literally impossible for MERS employees to execute 
and record all of the assignments and releases required by its enormous port-
folio of registered loans.  Instead, MERS adopted the practice of allowing its 
member lenders and servicers to appoint staff personnel as MERS corporate 
officers – typically vice presidents or assistant secretaries.  By some reports, 
more than 20,000 such individuals were appointed at one time,156 although 
the number has now dropped significantly.  The result was, of course, to at-
tach MERS’ name to literally millions of legal acts performed by people 
whom MERS had no capacity to train or supervise.  Anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that many of these “officers” were careless and sloppy in executing, 
acknowledging, and recording documents.  There is no particular reason to 
think that they would have been any more competent or careful if they had 
been acting formally for their own employers (which they were, as a practical 
matter), but at least their shoddy work would not have reflected on MERS. 
D.  Foreclosure in the Name of MERS. 
Until July 2011, when the practice was discontinued,157 MERS permit-
ted foreclosures of mortgages in its own name through the use of the thou-
sands of supposed “corporate officers” mentioned above with dubious author-
ity.  This practice was much litigated,158 and at the same time dealt MERS a 
severe public relations blow, because homeowners concluded that, “MERS is 
taking my house!”  The practice was evidently adopted in response to mort-
gage holders (and particularly Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) preferring not to 
be named plaintiffs in foreclosure actions for reputational reasons.  This prac-
tice spared mortgage holders some of the blame for foreclosures at the ex-
pense of MERS. 
  
 156. See MERSCORP CEO “There are 20,000 (Robosigners) of Those Nation 
Wide”, STOP FORECLOSURE FRAUD (Nov. 2010), 
http://stopforeclosurefraud.com/2010/11/20/video-merscorp-ceo-there-are-20000-
robo-signers-of-those-nationwide/. 
 157. MERS Policy Bulletin 2011-5, July 21, 2011. 
 158. Cases upholding MERS’ right to foreclose in its own name: Velasco v. Sec. 
Nat’l Mortg. Co., 823 F. Supp. 2d 1061 (D. Haw. 2011); Crafted Homes, Inc. v. 
Burnett (In re Burnett), 450 B.R. 589 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2011); Ferguson v. Avelo 
Mortg., LLC, 126 Cal. Rptr. 3d 586 (Cal. Ct. App.  2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
2772 (2012); Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Saurman, 805 N.W.2d 183 (Mich. 
2011). Contra Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Graham, 247 P.3d 223 (Kan. Ct. 
App. 2010) (rejecting MERS’ right to foreclose on the ground that it had suffered no 
injury from the default); Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc. v. Saunders, 2 A.3d 289 
(Me. 2010) (same); Weingartner v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1276 (D. 
Nev. 2010) (“MERS’ ‘beneficial interest’ is nonexistent unless MERS holds the un-
derlying debt, and it does not.”). 
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Related problems have arisen with MERS in its capacity as a nominal 
mortgagee for purposes of receiving notice of other legal proceedings affect-
ing the real estate or the loan.  MERS operates a “mail room” facility for the 
purpose of passing along such notices to the real holder of the promissory 
note.  Unfortunately, several courts have held that, because it is a “mere 
nominee” and not the actual holder, it is not a real party in interest and has no 
right to be joined or notified of such proceedings.159  The result has been to 
deny notice to parties who were obviously in need of it, thereby robbing them 
of their priority or the opportunity to put on a defense – a spectacularly unjust 
outcome. 
E.  Transparency 
MERS has traditionally offered only limited transparency to debtors or 
the public.  Its web site’s query system was set up mainly to provide the iden-
tity of the servicers of its loans, and it strongly encourages borrowers with 
questions or concerns to contact their servicers.160  Until July 2010, it was not 
possible for a mortgage debtor to discover the identity of the investor who 
held his or her mortgage (as distinct from the servicer) by a query to the 
MERS web site.161  Information about investors has now been added,162 and 
individual investors are no longer permitted to opt out of the database.163 
MERS’ traditional reluctance to help borrowers identify investors is un-
derstandable.  For the most part, investors do not want to communicate with 
  
 159. Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009). 
 160. See FAQ: Why Do I Need to Know the Identity of my Servicer?, MERS, 
http://www.mersinc.org/information-for-homeowners/faq-information-for-
homeowners#howcanifindout (last visited Jan. 17, 2013) (“If you are unable to make 
the payments on your mortgage and wish to negotiate the terms of your loan, you may 
only do so with your Servicer.  Contrary to popular belief, it is your servicer and not 
the investor that can negotiate the terms of the loan with you”). 
 161. See Ralph Roberts, Who Owns My Mortgage?, REALTY TIMES (Apr. 27, 
2009), http://realtytimes.com/rtpages/20090427_ownmortgage.htm (“MERS 
makes the name and contact information of the servicer available, but not the 
name and contact of the investor.  That information is for the servicer or investor 
to disclose, not MERS”).  Note that this statement is no longer entirely correct.  
See infra note 162. 
 162. See Karmela Lejarde, Press Release, MERS, MERS Expands Website to 




 163. E-mail from Bill Beckman, President, MersCorp Holdings, Inc., to author 
(March 28, 2012) (on file with author) (“MERSCORP discloses 100% of servicers 
and over 98% of investors via our website or toll free line to borrowers (it’s no longer 
an investor opt-in) . . . a change made last year due to the groundswell of concern 
over ‘transparency.’”). 
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mortgage borrowers; rather, they want their servicers to perform this task.  
Many of them are banks serving as trustees of securitized mortgage trusts.  
They lack the staffs and resources to carry on such communications, and if 
they attempt it, they run the risk of making statements or taking actions that 
will run counter to their own servicers’ decisions.  
Borrowers are apt to view the situation quite differently.  In many cases 
they have received abysmally poor assistance and communication from 
servicers,164 and they understandably want satisfaction from those who em-
ploy those servicers.  As a consequence of recent changes in MERS policy, 
they can now identify the relevant investors.  The statement of MERS’ former 
president that “the MERS process of tracking mortgages and holding title 
provides clarity, transparency and efficiency to the housing finance sys-
tem,”165 once wildly optimistic, is now much closer to the truth. 
F.  Loan Tracking Accuracy 
It is widely asserted that MERS’ records of mortgage ownership, even 
when they are available, are often inaccurate.  It is difficult to assess the truth 
of this claim with any precision, but it would hardly be surprising if it were 
so.  MERS has no leverage to require its members to report loan transfers to 
it, and it is likely that large numbers of transfers go unreported.  Until a mort-
gage needs to be foreclosed or released, MERS simply does not need infor-
mation about who holds the loan.  Hence, one cannot treat MERS as a source 
of correct information about the identity of mortgage loan investors, just as 
(and for the same reason that) local public real estate records often did not 
provide correct information identifying investors in the pre-MERS era.166  
This fact has clearly undermined MERS’ credibility. 
In summary, MERS labors under serious structural problems which 
make it a far cry from the sort of transparent, accurate, and reliable system of 
mortgage loan registration that many expected it to become when it was 
founded.  While these problems have widely been attributed to bad faith or 
bad motives, those criticisms are largely unfair and unwarranted.  Given the 
fact that MERS had no statutory foundation for its creation, its decisions may 
generally have seemed reasonable when they were made, even though many 
of them have worked out poorly.  Conceivably a statutory revamping of 
  
 164. See Nelson D. Schwartz, Some Doubt a Settlement Will End Mortgage Ills, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/business/some-
doubt-a-settlement-will-end-mortgage-ills.html?_r=1 (recounting difficulties of bor-
rowers in communicating with mortgage servicers). 
 165. See Karmela Lejarde, Press Release, MERS, Statement by R.K. Arnold, 




 166. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. 
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MERS could be accomplished, but by now MERS’ public reputation is so 
tarnished that such an effort seems likely to be frustrating and ultimately 
fruitless.  
At the same time, it is more obvious than ever that some sort of MERS-
like organization is needed to track the movements of the more than sixty 
million mortgages in the national secondary market.  What is needed is a 
fresh approach – one that will take the lessons of MERS into account, and 
will create a nationwide mortgage registration system without the limitations 
and defects of MERS – in other words, MERS done right.  That is the subject 
of the next section of this Article. 
III.  FEATURES OF A NATIONAL MORTGAGE LOAN REGISTRY 
I propose to outline here the features of a national mortgage loan Regis-
try167 that would be efficient and transparent; that is, it would be simple and 
inexpensive to register and transfer mortgage loans in the system, and the 
system would quickly and conveniently provide information about loan own-
ership and servicing authority to those who need it.  I have provided in an 
Appendix a draft of a statute that I believe would achieve these ends, and 
numerous footnotes in this section refer to the provisions of that statute. 
A.  Federal Preemption. 
The system I envision must be enacted by Congress in order to preempt 
state law.168  While in theory changes in state law could accomplish the goal 
of creating a national registry, there are at least four reasons why a state-
oriented approach would likely be exasperatingly slow and uncertain in out-
come, and why preemption is necessary.   
First, state law is bogged down with the inherent ambiguities of the 
UCC Article 3’s definition of negotiability, and the fact that only negotiable 
notes are governed by Article 3.169  One of the primary tasks of a federal stat-
ute would be to eliminate this distinction so far as mortgage notes are con-
cerned, and to treat all mortgage notes alike.  The uncertainty concerning 
what state law governs their transfer would become irrelevant. 
Second, a federal statute would eliminate the necessity for physical de-
livery of the original promissory note as a means of transferring the right of 
enforcement, as is now required by UCC Article 3 for negotiable notes.170  
The embodiment of the legal right in the physical instrument made sense in 
  
 167. I have capitalized the term “Registry” throughout this section when using it 
to refer to the registry that would be created by the Draft Statute, and to distinguish it 
from MERS and other possible registration systems. 
 168. Draft Statute § 112. 
 169. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text. 
 170. See supra notes 98-112 and accompanying text. 
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the era in which it was invented, but it is absurdly archaic in a time when 
records of virtually all property rights are maintained in electronic databases.  
The burdens and risks of transferring such huge volumes of paper are unnec-
essary and unacceptable.  Again, federal preemption can readily eliminate the 
need for this practice. 
Third, federal preemption can short-circuit the ongoing avalanche of 
litigation over precisely what proof is needed to foreclose a mortgage or bring 
a suit on a mortgage note.  American law is a confused morass on this issue.  
In a single stroke, a federal statute can provide that an appropriate certificate 
issued by a national mortgage Registry is adequate proof of the right to fore-
close in every jurisdiction in the country.171 
Fourth, a federal statute could immediately eliminate the confusion that 
has arisen about the supposed separation of the note and mortgage under the 
MERS system.172  A proper national registration system would not need to 
engage in the “nominee” sophistry on which MERS is based: it would track 
the right to enforce, but would not become the owner or an agent of the 
owner, of notes or mortgages.  Moreover, the governing statute could declare 
unambiguously that the mortgage and note cannot be separated, and that hold-
ing one is always holding both.173 
Is federal law really needed for these purposes?  Could not modifica-
tions of state law accomplish the same things?  In theory, the answer is yes, 
but only in part, and only if we are willing to wait a very long time.  Work 
has already begun on some elements of the task outlined above.  In January 
2012, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
announced the formation of a drafting committee to work on a uniform act 
dealing with the proof that must be adduced to foreclose a mortgage.174  Ten-
tatively entitled the Residential Real Estate Mortgage Foreclosure Process 
and Protections Act, this effort will almost certainly take at least two years to 
complete.175  It is not yet clear what form the act will take, and whether the 
result will gain traction with state legislatures is anyone’s guess.  State en-
actment is at best an incremental process requiring many years to complete.176  
  
 171. Draft Statute § 112(a). 
 172. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. 
 173. Draft Statute § 102(4). 
 174. See Mortgage Foreclosure: Resolution to Create Drafting Committee and 
Issues List, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION (Jan. 20, 2012), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mortgage%20foreclosure/2012may 
_RREMFPP_Resolution%20and%20Issues%20List.pdf. 
 175. Each uniform act must be considered at no less than two annual meetings 
before adoption by the Conference.  ULC Drafting Process, UNIFORM L. 
COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=ULC%20Drafting 
%20Process (last visited Jan. 17, 2013).  Many acts have required more than two 
years to complete.  See id.   
 176. This is well illustrated by the “progress,” such as it is, of the 2002 amend-
ments to U.C.C. Article 3, which among other things broaden the basis upon which a 
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National uniformity is highly desirable from the viewpoint of mortgage 
servicers, who otherwise must keep track of and qualify under multiple state 
law variations, as they do now.  But some states may never adopt the act, 
leaving uniformity a chimerical goal.  By comparison, congressional action 
can provide nationwide uniformity immediately. 
What of the other state law changes mentioned above – those that de-
pend on the operation of UCC article 3?  Again, in theory the state law an-
swer is simple: the Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial 
Code could recommend, and a drafting committee could then adopt, appro-
priate changes to Article 3.  One straightforward approach would be simply to 
declare that all promissory notes secured by real property are nonnegotia-
ble.177  I have previously recommended this step.178  However, the Permanent 
Editorial Board has shown no disposition to recommend any action with re-
spect to mortgage notes, and the matter appears to be in stasis.  The reasons 
for this unwillingness to act are unclear, and it is uncertain whether any 
change in attitude is likely in the foreseeable future.179  Even if it were to 
occur, the time required to make the changes applicable throughout the states 
would probably be lengthy. 
Registering and tracking mortgage loans in the United States is a na-
tional issue that requires a nationwide solution.  No existing federal agency 
has the authority to create such a solution, nor the power to preempt state law 
in the process of doing so.  When mortgage loans were assets traded only at 
the local level, or not at all, state law may have been satisfactory.  Today that 
  
“lost note affidavit” under U.C.C. § 3-309(g) may be employed by a party enforcing a 
negotiable note.  See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.  Ten years after 
adoption by the Permanent Editorial Board, this amendment has been enacted in only 
ten states. 
 177. This step would eliminate the need to characterize individual mortgage notes 
as negotiable or not, and also eliminate the necessity for physical delivery of the note 
as a means of transferring the right of enforcement. 
 178. See Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage 
Market, supra note 3, at 770. 
 179. On May 9, 2011, a “stakeholder’s meeting” was held in Washington, D.C., 
sponsored jointly by the American Law Institute and the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.  The meeting was attended by representatives 
of most of the major federal agencies and trade organizations that deal with the mort-
gage market.  Its purpose was to discuss proposals for resolving some of the uncer-
tainties that have generated litigation surrounding the secondary market and foreclo-
sures.  At that meeting, several other speakers and I recommended that the Permanent 
Editorial Board review the status of mortgage notes under UCC Article 3 with a view 
to clarifying the ambiguities and inefficiencies mentioned in the text.  Following the 
meeting, the Commissioners on Uniform Laws created a study committee that led, 
some eight months later, to the formation of the drafting committee mentioned previ-
ously.  See supra note 174 and accompanying text.  However, the American Law 
Institute did not elect to take any specific action in response to these comments, and 
without ALI direction, it appeared unlikely that the PEB would take action. 
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era has passed.  Only action by Congress can address the needs of the na-
tional market that now exists. 
B.  What is Being Registered – Ownership or the Right to Enforce? 
It is important to be perfectly clear about what legal attributes are to be 
registered in a new registration system.  We sometimes use the term “owner-
ship” to describe the rights of mortgage investors, but it should be employed 
only in a colloquial sense.  The Uniform Commercial Code distinguishes 
between ownership and the “entitlement to enforce” a note.180  In essence, 
any third party who can identify the person “entitled to enforce” the note can 
deal safely with that person.  Thus, the basic obligation under the note is to 
pay that person, and payment to him or her will discharge the note, while 
failure to pay that person when due will constitute dishonor – in effect, a de-
fault on the note.181  
It is this quality that needs to be tracked in a mortgage Registry, so that 
all third parties can determine, by reviewing the Registry that they are dealing 
with the correct person for all purposes.  Ownership, as the UCC understands 
the term, is a different matter; it determines who is entitled to the economic 
benefits of the note – the money received when the note is paid, for example.  
While this is usually the same as the “person entitled to enforce,” it is not 
necessarily so.182  But third parties who look up a loan in the national Regis-
try have no particular interest in learning the identity of the “owner” of the 
note in this sense.  They simply need to know that if they pay, or agree to a 
modification with, or are foreclosed by, the person identified in the Registry, 
they are dealing with (or being dealt with by) the person with the proper 
authority.  Once the note is paid, for example, the person who has paid it sim-
ply does not care if the person receiving the payment has a duty to hold the 
funds for, or remit them to, someone else – an “owner” in UCC parlance, as 
distinct from a person entitled to enforce.  
In the Draft Statute in Appendix A, I have chosen to use the term 
“holder” as a shorthand way of describing the person that UCC Article 3 
would say is “entitled to enforce” the note.183  This usage is similar to Article 
3’s use of the same term, and thus has the advantage of familiarity.184  The 
Draft Statute, however, expands the grant of authority of the holder to include 
all forms of enforcement of the mortgage itself as well as the note, so as to 
  
 180. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
 181. See PEB REPORT, supra note 21, at 4. 
 182. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. 
 183. Draft Statute § 102(3). 
 184. This is not to say that the Draft Statute’s requirements for becoming a holder 
are identical to U.C.C. Article 3’s requirements.  See U.C.C. § 3-301 (2012).  Under 
the Draft Statute, unlike U.C.C. Article 3, a person need not have taken physical de-
livery of the note in order to be a holder, and there is no provision for (and no need 
for) a “lost note affidavit” procedure if the original note cannot be produced. 
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make it completely clear that the same party can enforce both instruments, 
and that the two instruments are bound together as if they were one.  The 
most obvious illustration of this expansion is the positive statement in the 
Draft Statute that the holder can foreclose the mortgage securing the note.185  
Likewise, the holder of the note and mortgage can agree to a modification of 
the obligation, or consent (under the authority of a due on sale clause) to a 
transfer of the real estate securing the note.  The holder can also bring an 
action to enforce any covenant in the mortgage (as well as the note, of 
course), although admittedly such actions are not very common.  Overall, the 
concept adopted in the Draft Statute is that the holder can safely be dealt with 
by the maker-mortgagor or any other person for any purpose related to the 
note or the mortgage.186  Finally, only the holder can make a transfer of the 
mortgage loan to another holder.187 
Thus, the Draft Statute is about registering holders.  The Registry need 
not be concerned with relations between holders and owners (in the cases in 
which they are, indeed, different), for anyone who deals with the holder will 
be assured that the resulting bargain is binding on the owner as well.  Indeed, 
the Draft Statute provides in effect that an owner who is not also a holder has 
no authority to deal with the maker or other parties.188  UCC Article 9 gov-
erns the rights of owners as such, and provides, in substance, that one who 
buys the rights to a note may become an owner either by taking possession of 
the note or by a written agreement signed by the transferor.189  This approach 
will continue to be entirely satisfactory if the Draft Statute is adopted, and 
there is no need for the Registry to preempt it or deal with it further. 
The Registry must also accommodate “transferrable electronic records.”  
This concept was developed to permit the use of electronic promissory notes 
in lieu of paper notes, primarily in real estate loan transactions.  The distin-
guishing feature of a “transferrable electronic record” is that only one authori-
tative electronic copy can exist at a time.  When such a note is transferred, the 
copy held by the transferee becomes authoritative, while any copy retained by 
the transferor becomes non-authoritative.  The result is the practical equiva-
lent of physical delivery of an original paper note, and satisfies the delivery 
requirement for negotiable notes under UCC Article 3.190  The person to 
whom the note is issued or transferred is said to have “control” of the record, 
and only that person can authorize a further transfer or a modification of the 
  
 185. Draft Statute § 109(1).  U.C.C. Article 3 seems to imply this, but never states 
it directly, and as we have seen, a cluster of cases appears to deny that it is so.  See 
supra notes 112-31 and accompanying text. 
 186. Draft Statute § 109. 
 187. Draft Statute § 103(b), (c). 
 188. Draft Statute § 109. 
 189. See U.C.C § 9-203; PEB REPORT, supra note 21, at 9-10. 
 190. See supra notes  97-100 and accompanying text. 
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record.  Both the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA)191 and the 
federal eSign192 statute authorize transferrable electronic records in virtually 
identical language. 
Because the use of electronic note is gradually growing, it is obviously 
desirable for the federal mortgage loan Registry to recognize and register 
promissory notes in electronic form.  Under existing statutory definitions, the 
person having “control” of the record is the holder of the note for purposes of 
UCC Article 3.193  Hence, the Registry must maintain a record of, and certify 
the identity of, that person.  The Draft Statute defines “holder” to mean the 
person with control in the case of a transferrable electronic record,194 so that a 
certificate from the Registry identifying the holder will ipso facto certify the 
identity of the person with control. 
C.  Registration or Recording? 
There are two kinds of land records system in the United States, record-
ing and registration.195  This section will explain the conceptual differences 
between them, and will explain why the registration model is the one on 
which a national mortgage Registry should be based. 
By far the more prevalent system for American land records is termed 
“recording.”  A recording system is much like a public library.  Individuals 
(usually grantees or recipients of land interests) may enroll their documents in 
the system, and other individuals are free to consult the system and try to 
locate the documents that are relevant to their plans (usually to buy or take a 
security interest in a parcel of land).  The officials who operate the system are 
responsible only for accepting documents and indexing them in an organized 
fashion so that they can be located later; they make no attempt to determine 
who holds ownership rights or other interests in any particular parcel of land, 
and they make no averment of such rights to persons searching or inquiring of 
the system.  In effect, members of the public are invited to search the records 
and draw their own conclusions, an activity in which they typically get the 
assistance of attorneys or title insurers.  
In a recording system, no one is legally obligated to record anything and 
documents are fully valid as between their parties without recording.  How-
ever, persons receiving documents that transfer interests to them have a 
strong incentive to record those documents because if one fails to record, 
  
 191. UNIF. ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 16 (2012).  UETA has been 
adopted in all states except Illinois, New York, and Washington, which have locally-
tailored legislation that is roughly equivalent.  Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, 
NAT’L CONF.  ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/telecom 
/uniform-electronic-transactions-acts.aspx (last visited Nov. 26, 2012).   
 192. 15 U.S.C. § 7021 (2006). 
 193. Id. § 7021(d); UNIF. ELECTRONIC TRANSACTIONS ACT § 16(d).   
 194. Draft Statute § 103(c), (f). 
 195. See generally STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 11.9. 
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one’s grantor may later make a conflicting conveyance of the same property 
to a different grantee who, if properly qualified, may prevail over the original 
(but unrecorded) recipient.196 
A registration system is an entirely different creature.197  The public of-
ficials who operate a registration system are responsible to track, not merely 
documents, but actual property interests.  They issue certificates of title to 
persons acquiring interests in land, and those certificates are legally conclu-
sive.  Most of the developed world uses title registration systems,198 but in the 
United States it is available in only nine states, and is little used in most of 
them.199 
The Draft Statute would create a registration system, not a recording 
system.  The principal advantage of registration is that the certificates of the 
Registry would be conclusive.200  In effect, this means that they could not be 
legally incorrect.  If the Registry’s certificate states that a mortgage is held by 
a certain party, then that party is the holder.  This is a powerful feature; it 
means that anyone relying on the Registry can do so with complete confi-
dence. 
At the same time, there are powerful disadvantages.  Any system of title 
registration can make mistakes, either because of human error or because it 
has received fraudulent information.  If such mistakes have the effect of vest-
ing the holding of a mortgage loan in the hands of someone who is not enti-
tled to it, someone else will have been wrongfully deprived of that mortgage 
loan.  The deprived party will not be happy, and may come to the Registry 
and seek compensation.  To be fair and just, the Registry must provide such 
compensation, and must have funds out of which compensation can be paid. 
This is the feature that, probably more than any other, made the existing 
Torrens land title registration systems in the United States unsatisfactory.  It 
was widely asserted that compensation funds were inadequate, and compen-
sation was hard – sometimes bordering on impossible – to obtain, often re-
quiring litigation.201  However, there are some aspects of a mortgage registra-
tion system, as compared with a land title registration system, that greatly 
ameliorate these problems.  First, there is the fact that we are only talking 
about money.  Land is different: people have personal, family, and social 
  
 196. Id. 
 197. See generally id. § 11.15. 
 198. See Tim Hanstad, Designing Land Registration Systems for Developing 
Countries, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 647, 649 (1998). 
 199. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, PROPERTY, supra note 16, § 11.15. 
 200. Draft Statute § 110. 
 201. See BARLOW BURKE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS: EXAMPLES AND 
EXPLANATIONS 221 (4th ed. 2006); Comment, The Torrens System of Title Registra-
tion: A New Proposal for Effective Implementation, 29 UCLA L. REV. 661, 680-81 
n.95 (1982); Report 76 - Torrens Title: Compensation for Loss, NEW S. WALES L. 
REF. COMMISSION (1996), http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/r76toc. 
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attachments to land,202 and money may be a poor substitute for those attach-
ments.  But no one has a personal attachment to a mortgage loan, and money 
is always a perfectly acceptable substitute. 
A second distinction between land title registration and mortgage regis-
tration is that it is entirely unnecessary for the mortgage loan Registry to be 
concerned about land titles or land descriptions.  One of the most challenging 
aspects of administering a Torrens land registration system arises from the 
need to identify unambiguously the parcel or parcels of land affected by any 
transaction.  This requires a great deal of training and skill, particularly when 
one considers all of the ways in which land parcels can be subdivided and 
combined.  It is easy to make a mistake.  
A mortgage loan, on the other hand, can easily be assigned a unique 
identifying number when the loan is originated or registered, and that number 
can be used to track it throughout its life.  We have been doing this with the 
Vehicle Identification Numbers on motor vehicles for many decades.203  
MERS has used just such a system of mortgage identification numbers, and in 
that respect MERS seems to have worked exceptionally well.  A further sim-
plifying factor is that the holding of mortgage loans, unlike land, is never 
consolidated or subdivided.  The mortgaged land’s description or identifica-
tion will be completely outside the scope of the Registry’s operations.  Inves-
tors in mortgage loans will continue to rely on title insurance, as at present, 
for land title security. 
Other steps can be taken to minimize the risk of the Registry’s issuing 
erroneous certificates.  Fraudulent submissions to the Registry can be dis-
couraged, if not entirely avoided, by the existence of heavy criminal penalties 
and civil liability.204  Standardized data sets and electronic formats can help 
avoid errors; indeed, the Federal Housing Finance Agency has been working 
aggressively on developing just such data sets.205  Moreover, if the Registry 
  
 202. See, e.g., Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 942-43 (Colo. 2002) (holding that a 
77,000 acre parcel in southern Colorado held by way of Torrens title was subject to 
easement rights of several thousand descendants of the original Mexican settlers). 
 203. Motor vehicle title histories are maintained and tracked by the National Mo-
tor Vehicle Title Information System, established by the Anti Car Theft Act of 1992, 
and operated under the authority of the U.S. Department of Justice by the American 
Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators.  See 49 U.S.C. §§ 30502, 30503 
(2006).  The functions of the agency are nicely explained in the preamble to 28 C.F.R. 
§ 25.51 (2010). 
 204. Draft Statute § 113. 
 205. The Federal Housing Finance Agency has described its efforts to develop 
mortgage information standards as follows: 
The Uniform Mortgage Data Program will im-
prove the consistency, quality, and uniformity 
of data collected at the beginning of the lend-
ing process.  Developing standard terms, defi-
nitions, and industry standard data reporting 
protocols will decrease costs for originators 
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issues an erroneous certificate, it should have the power to revoke it if no 
person has relied upon it detrimentally and in good faith.206 
No system is perfect, and doubtless errors will sometimes occur, requir-
ing the payment of compensation.  But it seems entirely plausible to assume 
that errors will be rare and manageable, and that the system can readily build 
their cost into its fee structure. 
D.  Initial Recording of Mortgages 
The Draft Statute requires, as a condition of the registration of any 
mortgage loan in the Registry, that the mortgage itself first be recorded or 
registered in the land records under state law in order to establish its prior-
ity.207  This is absolutely essential, for the Registry is not intended to deter-
mine the mortgage’s validity or priority as against other interests under state 
law, or to be a substitute for local recording of the mortgage itself.  The exist-
ing state recording system works well enough for that purpose, and attempt-
ing to supplant it with a federal system would vastly expand the Registry’s 
role, and would create conflicts and complexities that are entirely unneces-
sary.  In theory, it would be possible for the Draft Statute to treat an unre-
corded mortgage as acceptable for registration in the federal Registry, but no 
one except a fool takes a mortgage on land without recording it, and there is 
no need for the Registry to serve fools. 
E.  Electronic Registration and Transfer and the Problem of Document 
Authenticity. 
The Registry, as envisioned in the Draft Statute, will be a paperless op-
eration.208  Initial registrations and all transfers from one holder to another 
  
and appraisers and reduce repurchase risk.  It 
will allow new entrants to use industry stan-
dards rather than having to develop their own 
proprietary data systems to compete with other 
systems already in the market.  Common data 
definitions, electronic data capture, and stan-
dardized data protocols will improve effi-
ciency, lower costs and enhance risk monitor-
ing.  Standardizing data will be a key building 
block of housing finance reform. 
News Release, Fed. Housing Fin. Agency, FHFA Sends Congress Strategic Plan for 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Conservatorships 10 (Feb. 21, 2012), available at 
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23344/StrategicPlanConservatorshipsFINAL.pdf. 
 206. Draft Statute § 110(c). 
 207. Draft Statute § 103(a). 
 208. The Draft Statute permits paper registrations, but it is expected that they will 
be rare.  Id. 
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will be accomplished electronically.  This means that the reliability and 
authenticity of the original registration process is critical.209  The Registry can 
identify an entity registering a mortgage loan, and verify the authenticity of 
the message containing the registration data, through the use of public key 
cryptography.  There are a number of experienced, reliable providers of digi-
tal signatures based on this technology, and if their services are properly used, 
one can have extremely high confidence in the identity of the sender and the 
fact that message as received was exactly what was transmitted.  The same 
procedure can be used when a holder wishes to transfer an already-registered 
loan.  While the technical details of these operations are outside the scope of 
the present Article, they are readily available from other sources.210 
This leaves the question of the authenticity of the original loan docu-
ments.  The party submitting the mortgage loan for registration can and 
should be required to attach scans of the note and mortgage, including their 
signature pages.211  But that does not prove that the documents are not forger-
ies.  A mortgagee title insurance policy provides protection against forgery of 
the mortgage, at least in the hands of a transferee from the original mortga-
gee.  But title insurance does not cover the note,212 and a mortgage without an 
accompanying authentic note is worthless. 
Of course, this problem is not unique to an electronic Registry.  A paper 
document purporting to be an original promissory note might be also a for-
gery, and there have surely been instances of such false notes being sold on 
the secondary market.213  Almost universally, under the purchase and sale 
agreement the seller of such a note is obligated to buy it back and reimburse 
the purchaser.214  But this is cold comfort if the seller has been dissolved or is 
insolvent, as crooked sellers of mortgage loans tend to be. 
  
 209. Draft Statute § 103(d). 
 210. See, e.g., R.J. Robertson, Jr., Electronic Commerce on the Internet and the 
Statute of Frauds, 49 S.C. L. REV. 787, 820-21 nn.197-209 (1998); Dale A. Whitman, 
Are We There Yet? The Case for a Uniform Electronic Recording Act, 24 W. NEW 
ENG. L. REV. 245, 258-59 nn.60-63 (2002). 
 211. Draft Statute § 107.  Other essential documents in the preregistration “chain 
of title” of the loan, such as mortgage assignments, note endorsements or allonges, 
and any modification, substitution, or assumptions agreements should also be submit-
ted with registration.  Id. § 107(a).  
 212. See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. XWarehouse Lending Corp., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
801 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (finding title insurance policy provided no compensation to 
holder of forged promissory note); see also Reyes v. Stewart Title of Cal., No. 
B224192, 2011 WL 3305974, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 3, 2011) (unpublished) (ab-
solving an escrow company of liability in a scheme by which a mortgage broker ob-
tained a borrower’s forged or fraudulent signature on a promissory note). 
 213. See, e.g., Maddox v. Summit Mortg. Corp., No. 09-00-771 CV, 2001 WL 
1805883 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2002).  
 214. See, e.g., POOLING AND SERVICING AGREEMENT, supra note 79, § 2.03: 
Upon discovery or receipt of notice of any 
materially defective document . . . the Trus-
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Perhaps the best answer to this question is for the Registry not to assume 
liability for the legal authenticity of the underlying documents.  This would 
leave the Registry to say, in effect, “We assure anyone relying on our records 
that the holder of this note and mortgage is indeed the person our records 
indicate.  However, we do not provide assurance that the note and mortgage 
themselves are authentic documents signed by the maker and mortgagor.”215  
This position should not produce any great shock in the market; after all, the 
traditional recording system provides no protection against forged or fraudu-
lent documents, either.  Indeed, for forged notes (as distinct from mortgages, 
for which title insurance is available) there is no protection to investors ex-
cept to use caution in deciding with which originators or sellers they will do 
business. 
F.  Registration of Servicing 
In most cases, it is not very useful for a mortgagor to know the identity 
of the investor who holds his or her loan.  The reason is that the investor has 
usually delegated to a servicer the authority to deal with the mortgagor; in-
deed, the investor typically is not equipped to, and does not wish to, have 
direct contact with borrowers.216  Hence, for a Registry to be helpful to bor-
rowers, it must reveal the servicer’s name and contact information as well as 
that of the holder of the loan. 
This is not to suggest that anyone has been trying to hide this informa-
tion.  MERS, for example, proclaims itself keen to help mortgagors contact 
their servicers.217  Federal law requires notification to the mortgagor of a 
“federally-related” mortgage loan each time servicing is transferred.218  
  
tee shall promptly notify . . . the Seller . . . 
and request that the Seller . . . cure such de-
fect or breach [and upon its failure to do so] 
. . . the Trustee[] shall enforce the obliga-
tions of the Seller under the Mortgage Loan 
Purchase Agreement to repurchase such 
Mortgage Loan. 
See also, e.g., Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc. v. 1st New England Mortg. Corp., No. 09-
11082-GAO, 2012 WL 3984413 (D. Mass. Sept. 12, 2012) (upholding a loan origina-
tor’s repurchase obligation where the loan was based on a fraudulent loan applica-
tion). 
 215. See Draft Statute § 110(a). 
 216. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text. 
 217. See the MERS ServicerID, MERS, https://www.mers-servicerid.org/sis/ (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
 218. The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. § 2605 
(2006), requires the existing servicer to notify the borrower no less than 15 days be-
fore the transfer, and the new servicer to notify the borrower within 15 days after the 
transfer.  Under 2009 amendments to the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 
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Servicers are usually eager to keep mortgagors up to date, because they want 
to avoid any excuse for late or missing payments. 
The term “servicer” is not, however, self-defining.  A servicer is an 
agent with specific authority, and it is desirable for the holder of the loan to 
spell out that authority in a way that is available and intelligible to the public.  
For this reason, the Draft Statute allows holders to designate servicers in the 
Registry’s records219 (as they have a strong self-interest in doing), but re-
quires that those doing so must provide a brief description of the servicer’s 
authority.220  This could easily be accomplished with a “check the box” sys-
tem for the usual powers, along with an opportunity to provide a textual ex-
planation of any unusual authority.  There would be no objection to a holder 
identifying multiple servicers, perhaps with different scopes of authority. 
G.  Capturing the Entire Loan File 
To be truly useful to investors and servicers, the Registry should en-
courage registrants to submit the entire loan file to the Registry’s custody.  As 
mentioned above, full scanned images of the note and mortgage – the two 
documents that form the legal core of the loan transactions – should be held 
by the Registry.221  Secondary market investors typically insist on receiving 
copies of a number of other documents from the loan file as well: the ap-
praisal, credit report, lender’s title insurance policy, mortgage insurance ap-
plication and certificate, and any pre-registration assignments, modifications, 
or assumption agreements. 
Standards have been developed or are currently in development by the 
Mortgage Industry Standards Maintenance Organization (MISMO) for the 
representation of all of these types of documents in digital form.222  MISMO, 
established in 1999, was created “to coordinate the development and mainte-
nance of Internet-based Extensible Markup Language (XML)” data sets for 
  
1641(g)(1) (Supp. III 2009), consumer borrowers are also entitled to mailed notice of 
the identity of the new creditor (investor) within 30 days after a transfer of the loan 
itself. 
 219. Draft Statute § 106. 
 220. Id.  For example, does the servicer have authority to modify the loan?  To 
subordinate it to other liens?  To approve a sale of the real estate under the mortgage’s 
due-on-sale clause?  To issue a satisfaction when the loan is paid?  To foreclose?  
This information should assist borrowers in being certain that they are seeking an-
swers from the right entity. 
 221. Draft Statute § 107. 
 222. For example, the MISMO standard data sets for the common documents in 
residential mortgage transactions may be seen online.  See  Residential Specifications, 
MISMO, http://www.mismo.org/Specifications/ResidentialSpecifications.htm (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
57
Whitman: Whitman: Proposal for a National
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: WhitmanPaginated.docx Created on:  10/21/13 8:58 PM Last Printed: 11/3/13 11:14 PM 
58 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78  
 
all of the usual documents employed in mortgage loan transactions.223  Using 
MISMO’s standards, it would be feasible for a national mortgage Registry to 
capture and preserve the essential elements of any loan file, residential or 
commercial, in a standardized, compact, and efficient form.224  There would 
be no need for scanned images of these documents, as the XML data would 
contain all of the variable information from them.  
Of course, inclusion of this additional data would be optional with the 
registrant, but there is reason to expect it to be extremely popular.  Centraliz-
ing this data in a national Registry would mean that it would be unnecessary 
for one mortgage holder to transfer photocopies of the file documents to an-
other when a loan was sold on the secondary market.  A transfer of the loan in 
Registry would automatically make the full file available to the loan’s new 
holder.  There are huge efficiencies to be gained by such a procedure, and it 
might be one of the most attractive features of a national Registry to the 
mortgage industry. 
H.  Transparency 
In the United States we have long been accustomed to the notion that the 
identity of a mortgage holder is a matter of public record.  As discussed ear-
lier, in recent decades this has been far from universally true, as mortgage 
investors have increasingly abandoned the practice of recording mortgage 
assignments on a current basis.225  Of course, virtually all mortgages are re-
corded, and assignments sometimes continue to be recorded as well.  This 
salutary practice should be carried over to a national mortgage Registry.  Any 
member of the public should be able to inquire, via the internet, and deter-
mine the identity of any mortgage’s holder and servicer, and to request copies 
of the basic mortgage and other mortgage-related documents, such as pre-
registration assignments, modifications, assumption agreements, and the like 
– all of the documents which were traditionally recordable and recorded in 
the existing real estate records.226 
Ready availability of information about servicer identity would be a par-
ticular boon to those who pay off mortgage loans.  Most payoffs are done by 
“settlement agents,” of course, title companies, escrow companies, and law-
yers.  In the present environment they are often uncertain of the identity of 
the loan servicer to whom payment should be made, and find themselves rely-
ing on information of dubious credibility.  An accurate and transparent on-
line source of this information would be a great advantage to them. 
  
 223. FAQ, What is MISMO?, MISMO, http://www.mismo.org/GettingStarted/ 
FAQs.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2013). 
 224. Draft Statute § 107. 
 225. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text. 
 226. Draft Statute § 108(a). 
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With respect to the other information held by the Registry, beyond the 
identity of the investor and servicer and the traditionally recorded documents, 
privacy concerns outweigh the public’s need to know.  For example, promis-
sory notes are not ordinarily recorded under state law, and making them 
available to the public on the Registry would be open to serious criticism 
from both lenders and borrowers, who may often wish to keep the details of 
their loan agreement confidential.  Hence, the note and the remainder of the 
information held on a particular loan should be accessible only to the regis-
tered holder of the loan, the servicer, the borrower, and any successor owner 
of the mortgaged real estate.227 
I.  Fees 
A national Registry should be financially self-sustaining, and hence 
should be authorized to charge fees appropriate to pay its costs of operation, 
including a sufficient indemnity or insurance fund to cover payouts required 
by errors.228  A fee structure similar to that currently charged by MERS might 
be appropriate.229  MERS charges an annual membership fee that varies from 
$150 to $7,500, depending on the volume of loans registered each year.230  In 
addition, there is a charge of $11.95 for each registration or transfer.231  It is 
likely that fees on this order could sustain a new Registry adequately.  Of 
course, some federal appropriation of startup funds will be needed. 
J.  Notice of Registered Information 
In order to protect the registered holder of a loan from a fraudulent re-
lease by the original mortgage,232 and to ensure that the registered holder will 
get notice of litigation or other proceedings that may affect the loan,233 it is 
essential that the registration provide notice of its contents.  Perhaps, as an 
official public-accessible record, a federal registration would be construed to 
have that effect under existing state law, but the cases defining whether a 
particular record gives constructive notice are variable and unpredictable.234  
  
 227. Draft Statute § 108(b). 
 228. Draft Statute § 111. 
 229. Fee Schedule, MERS, http://www.mersinc.org/mersproducts 
/pricing.aspx?mpid=1 (last visited Jan. 18, 2013).  
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. See supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text. 
 233. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text. 
 234. See, e.g., Hahn v. Alaska Title Guar. Co., 557 P.2d 143  (Alaska 1976) (hold-
ing public land order filed with the federal registrar in Washington, D.C. imparted 
constructive notice); New England Fed. Credit Union v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 765 
A.2d 450 (Vt. 2000) (holding the failure to obtain a subdivision permit in violation of 
state public  health regulations was a matter of public record, imparting constructive 
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It is better to include in the governing federal statute a clear statement that the 
registration imparts notice; the Draft Statute does so.235 
Of course, in a sense this provision complicates title searches, because 
now there is one additional place a searcher must look for relevant title in-
formation.  Fortunately, this task could be completed quickly online, and will 
impose only a minor additional burden.  Particularly for those who are about 
to commence foreclosures, the transparency and certainty provided by the 
Registry will be a highly advantageous. 
When a prior lien is being foreclosed judicially, the date of the proce-
dure’s inception – and hence the date on which junior interests must be of 
record in order for their holders to be entitled to notice of the senior foreclo-
sure – is usually obvious.236  However, non-judicial foreclosures do not, by 
definition, involve a judicial filing, and they often require a combination of 
acts (mailed notice, posting on the real estate, publication, and/or recording) 
as prerequisites to the holding of a foreclosure sale.  Hence, state non-judicial 
foreclosure statutes must state some specific date for ascertaining who is enti-
tled to notice.  If they require notice to holders of junior liens at all,237 they 
usually provide that the person filing the foreclosure is required to notify only 
those whose junior liens are of record at the beginning of a specific time pe-
riod, such as 30 to 120 days, prior to the announced date of the foreclosure 
sale.238 
  
notice).  But see City of Lakewood v. Mavromatis, 817 P.2d 90 (Colo. 1991) (holding 
delivery of road petition to county clerk gave no constructive notice); Ioannou v. 
Southold Town Planning Bd. (In re Ioannou), 758 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2003) (holding covenants filed with town planning board gave no constructive no-
tice); First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834 (Utah 1998) (holding 
road maps filed with county clerk’s office gave no constructive notice).  
 235. Draft Statute § 112(c). 
 236. See, e.g., Citicorp Mortg., Inc. v. Pessin, 570 A.2d 481 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 1990).  The foreclosing lender prepared its complaint on October thirteenth, but 
did not file it until October nineteenth.  Id. at 482.  Meanwhile, an assignment of a 
junior mortgage to Pessin was recorded on October sixteenth.  Id.  The court held that 
Pessin was not bound by the foreclosure decree.  Id. at 485.  The effect of the ruling is 
to require the foreclosing party to search down to the very moment the foreclosure 
complaint is filed.  Parties whose junior interests go on record after the date of filing 
of the senior proceeding are bound by the doctrine of lis pendens, and no personal 
service or notice need be given to them.  Id. at 482.  
 237. Only a little more than half of the non-judicial foreclosure statutes provide 
for personal notice to holders of junior interests, and even those vary considerably 
with respect to the types of junior interest holders entitled to notice.  See Nelson & 
Whitman, Reforming Foreclosure, supra note 47, at 1431 n.124.  
 238. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1506 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. 
Sess.) (requiring 120 days prior to date of sale); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46 § 45 (West, 
Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.) (requiring 30 days prior to date of sale); VA. CODE 
ANN. § 55-59.1 (West, Westlaw through 2012 Spec. Sess.) (requiring 30 days prior to 
date of sale). 
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The language of the draft statute is intended to take these variations in 
state law into account by making the information in the Registry constructive 
notice as of the date the person instituting the non-judicial foreclosure of a 
prior mortgage is required to notify junior interest holders.239  While this lan-
guage was drafted with non-judicial foreclosure of senior mortgages in mind, 
it would apply to any sort of proceeding in which notice must be given to 
affected parties ascertained as of a date prior to the filing of the proceeding.  
Note that nothing in the draft statute changes state foreclosure law or rede-
fines who is entitled to notice of a foreclosure proceeding.  It merely allows 
the Registry to act just as state recording systems act to impart constructive 
notice of recorded documents and the facts they contain. 
K.  A Bureaucratic Home 
One of the most challenging questions involved in creating a national 
mortgage Registry is deciding where it will be housed.  At least three ap-
proaches to this problem may be envisioned.  First, the Registry might be 
made a part of an existing federal government agency.  The Draft Statute 
assumes that this method will be employed, but does not identify a particular 
agency.  Obviously, an agency that already has some experience with the 
mortgage market makes most sense.  Possible candidates include the Federal 
Reserve Board,240 the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,241 the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development,242 the Federal Housing Fi-
nance Agency,243 and the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.244 
There are clear advantages to placing the Registry within an existing 
agency: it will already have some level of expertise in dealing with the sec-
ondary mortgage market, and will have a degree of permanence and stability 
that market participants can rely upon.  On the other hand, many federal 
  
 239. Draft Statute § 112(c)(2). 
 240. The “Fed” supervises state-chartered banks that are members of the Federal 
Reserve System, among many other responsibilities.  See 12 C.F.R. § 208 (2012).  
 241. The OCC, housed within the Department of the Treasury, is the primary 
supervisor of national banks and federal savings associations.  See 12 C.F.R. § 1-1.  
 242. HUD is the home of the Federal Housing Administration and the Govern-
ment National Mortgage Association, which issues guarantees of mortgage-backed 
securities, as well as many other mortgage-related programs.  See 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.1, 
300.3.  
 243. FHFA supervises Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan 
Banks.  See 12 C.F.R. § 1282.1. 
 244. The CFPB, created by the Dodd-Frank Act, Public Law 111-203, has inher-
ited a number of mortgage-related regulatory responsibilities from other federal agen-
cies, including the Truth-in-Lending Act, the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act.   See 12 
C.F.R. § 1082.1.  A complete list is found at Regulations, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/regulations/ (last visited Jan. 
2, 2013). 
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agencies have reputations for timidity and sluggishness in decision-making, 
which might lead members of the mortgage industry to doubt whether the 
Registry will be responsive to their practical needs. 
A second approach is to simply clothe MERS with the authority and re-
sponsibility of the new Registry.  After all, MERS has nearly twenty years of 
experience as a mortgage registry, and in most ways has proven itself effi-
cient in meeting the industry’s needs.  It has a technical staff that is probably 
better equipped than any federal agency to put in place the changes needed to 
operate a federal Registry of the type outlined in this Article.  One might 
think of the new Registry as “MERS on steroids,” and there are surely great 
efficiencies in allowing MERS to implement the needed alterations instead of 
starting from ground zero in some other agency. 
At the same time, MERS has a dramatically negative public image, if 
largely for reasons beyond its control.245  If it is given the task of operating 
the new Registry, a clear first order of business would be a name change.  But 
this may not be enough to squelch the critics, who tend to equate MERS with 
the incompetence, carelessness, and cupidity that have characterized the sec-
ondary market during the past decade.  Any nongovernmental entity like 
MERS, with a history of close connection to the mortgage finance industry, is 
likely to be the object of abiding distrust from consumer advocates. 
If MERS is given the job, this might be accomplished by “federalizing” 
MERS – in effect, converting it from a private corporation into a federal 
agency or a quasi-federal government-sponsored enterprise.246  Alternatively, 
MERS might remain a fully private corporation but enter into a contract with 
a federal agency to operate the registry for it, much in the manner that the 
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators operates the National 
Motor Vehicle Title Information System under contract with the Department 
of Justice.247  While there may be concerns about delegating this much fed-
eral authority to a private entity, MERS is obviously in a unique position, 
  
 245. See supra notes 141-47 and accompanying text. 
 246. The appetite of Congress for creating government-sponsored entities (GSEs) 
has surely been greatly dampened, if not destroyed, by the necessity of placing Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac, by far the two largest GSEs, into federal conservatorship be-
cause of their insolvency.  See Zachary A. Goldfarb et al., Treasury to Rescue Fannie 
and Freddie, WASH. POST, Sept. 7, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/09/06/AR2008090602540.html?hpid=topnews.  The political 
atmosphere has been rife with rancorous attacks on the fundamental concept of GSEs.  
See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Fannie, Freddie and You, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 
2008, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/14/opinion/14krugman.html?_r=2&oref=slogin&or
ef=slogin; Edward Pinto, Cleaning House: The Financial Crisis and the GSEs, THE 
AMERICAN, Dec. 20, 2011, http://www.american.com/archive/2011/december 
/cleaning-house-the-financial-crisis-and-the-gses. 
 247. See 74 Fed. Reg. 5740 (Jan. 30, 2009) (discussing the system and the role of 
the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators in operating it). 
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with extremely broad industry (if not public) support and a long history of 
engagement in an essentially similar activity. 
A third possibility is to delegate the federal authority described in the 
Draft Statute to one or more private companies that might elect to enter the 
field.  For example, a company now in the business of maintaining records of 
secondary market sales of credit card accounts receivable might be given a 
contract to engage in the essentially similar activity of registering transfers of 
mortgage loans.248  Conceivably more than one company could be granted 
identical federal authority and several could operate in the market simultane-
ously, as credit reporting companies do today.249  However, the analogy is far 
from perfect; credit reporting companies operate under federal regulation (the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act250), but they have no special grant of federal 
authority, as the mortgage loan Registry must have if it is to do its job prop-
erly.  Whether Congress would be willing to make such grants to unproven 
private companies is questionable.  Moreover, having more than one mort-
gage loan registry seems an obvious and unnecessary inefficiency. 
Ultimately, the decision about where to house a federal mortgage loan 
Registry is political in nature, and there is little purpose in trying to predict its 
outcome here.  Any of several possible models could work well. 
L.  The Holder in Due Course Doctrine 
Where would this proposal for a national mortgage loan Registry leave 
the holder in due course doctrine?  That doctrine, applicable only to negotia-
ble notes and embodied in Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code,251 
permits secondary market investors to take notes free of certain “personal” 
defenses that the maker of the note might raise.252  In the context of mortgage 
notes, perhaps the most salient illustration is a note the execution of which 
  
 248. One such company, Global Debt Registry, has an expressed interest to the 
author in getting into the mortgage loan registry business; conversation of the author 
with Mark Parsells, C.E.O. of Global Debt Registry, Feb. 29, 2012.  It currently main-
tains account-level chains of title for secondary market sales of credit card and other 
consumer and commercial debt.  See Debt Buying, Register Debt, Mortgage Owner-
ship-Mission, GLOBAL DEBT REGISTRY, http://www.globaldebtregistry.com/mission 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
 249. There are three principal national credit reporting companies: Transunion, 
Experian, and Equifax.  See Credit Report Companies, CREDIT SOURCE ONLINE, 
http://www.creditsourceonline.com/credit-report-companies.html (last visited Jan. 2, 
2013). 
 250. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006). 
 251. U.C.C. § 3-302 (2012). 
 252. The “personal” defenses usually identified by commentators (because they 
are not listed in the Code itself) are failure or lack of consideration, breach of war-
ranty, unconscionability, and fraud in the inducement.  See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT 
S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 15-1 (6th ed. 2010). 
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was induced by fraudulent statements.  A holder of due course of such a note 
can collect the note (and foreclose the accompanying mortgage) notwith-
standing the maker’s defense that he or she was defrauded into signing it. 
The doctrine was designed to allow notes issued by moneylenders, 
banks, and other financial institutions to pass freely in commerce.  Whether it 
should ever have been applied to notes issued by consumers is doubtful at 
best.253  In 1975, it was effectively repealed by the Federal Trade Commis-
sion for most types of consumer debt,254 but it remains the law for mortgage 
notes.  There are real cases (although not very many of them, it seems) in 
which secondary market investors raise it to assist them in foreclosing mort-
gages that quite arguably should not, in terms of fairness and justice, be en-
forceable.255  I, along with many other commentators, have argued that the 
doctrine should be repealed for mortgage notes,256 but that has not occurred. 
The Registry proposal presented here would have no formal impact, 
positive or negative, on the holder in due course doctrine.  The doctrine has 
always required that the secondary market investor must be a “holder” in the 
Article 3 sense, which in turn means that the investor must have taken posses-
sion of the original promissory note.257  The experience of the past decade 
suggests that the doctrine is not viewed as having much value for investors in 
  
 253. See Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Codification and the Victory of 
Form over Intent in Negotiable Instrument Law, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 363, 414-15 
(2002). 
 254. Preservation of Consumers’ Claims and Defenses, 16 C.F.R. § 433 (2011); 
Michael M. Greenfield & Nina L. Ross, Limits on a Consumer’s Ability to Assert 
Claims and Defenses Under the FTC’s Holder in Due Course Rule, 46 BUS. LAW. 
1135, 1136 (1991). 
 255. See, e.g., Dupuis v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 879 F. Supp. 139, 146-47 
(D. Me. 1995) (holding borrowers could not raise defense based on failure to disburse 
full loan proceeds against FHLMC, which was a holder in due course); Hunt v. Na-
tionsCredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 902 So. 2d 75, 86 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) (holding bor-
rowers could not raise defenses of failure of consideration and lack of mutual assent 
against note buyer who was holder in due course); Gonzales v. Am. Title Co., 104 
S.W.3d 588, 594-95 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003) (holding borrowers could not raise defense 
of fraud in the inducement against note buyer who was holder in due course); White 
v. Gilliam, 419 S.E.2d 247 (Va. 1992) (similar). 
 256. Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage Mar-
ket, supra note 3, at 766-69; Siddhartha Venkatesan, Note, Abrogating the Holder in 
Due Course Doctrine in Subprime Mortgage Transactions to More Effectively Police 
Predatory Lending, 7 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 216, 216 n.223 (2003).  
Several other similar comments are cited in Greenlee & Fitzpatrick IV, supra note 3, 
at 47 n.194.  
 257. U.C.C. § 3-203 (2012); PEB REPORT, supra note 21, at 5-6. 
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notes258 because there has been a widespread pattern of failure to ensure that 
the original note is delivered when a loan is sold.  
Of course, under traditional commercial and mortgage law, there has 
been a much more important reason for an investor to insist on a delivery of 
the note: only by delivery can the entitlement to enforce a negotiable note be 
transferred.259  Under the Registry proposal made here, that will no longer be 
true.  A properly registered holder of a loan will have the right to enforce the 
note and foreclose the mortgage whether possession of the original note has 
been delivered or not.  Indeed, under this proposal, becoming a holder is due 
course would be the only remaining reason for an investor to bother taking 
possession of the note.  This fact suggests that taking possession would be 
likely to happen very rarely indeed, and that the holder in due course status of 
mortgage investors as a class would probably wither and die like Marx’s capi-
talist state.  But there would be nothing in the Registry system that would 
prevent an investor from demanding possession of the note, if that should be 
the investor’s desire. 
M.  Constitutionality 
The creation of a federal loan Registry by act of Congress raises two 
constitutional questions, although neither is very difficult.  First, is this action 
within the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause?  Second, if exist-
ing mortgage loans can be registered, do the changes in legal expectations 
and contractual relationships that result violate the Due Process clause of the 
Fifth Amendment? The answers to these questions are reasonably clear: Con-
gress is free to act in this area, and no allegation of a Due Process violation 
can be seriously raised. 
It may be well to begin with a review of what the Draft Statute does and 
does not do.  The primary activity that it authorizes is record-keeping, not 
regulation.  It is intended to replace a dysfunctional state-law system of re-
cords with a functional federal system.  It makes no substantive change in 
state law legal systems that assign priority to liens, create mortgage foreclo-
sure processes, or release or modify mortgages and their corresponding debts.  
Participation in the Registry would be completely voluntary on the part of 
mortgage holders, who would be entirely free to continue to rely on the exist-
ing system of note delivery and recording of mortgage assignments, or for 
that matter on MERS if it continues to exist. 
While participation would be optional, certain legal consequences would 
flow from the exercise of that option.  Once a loan was registered, it could be 
transferred only by means of the Registry.  The designation of a servicer 
  
 258. This suggestion was first made more than 15 years ago by Ronald J. Mann.  
See Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and Credit Systems, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 951, 970-71 (1997). 
 259. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. 
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would be ineffective until registered.  Obligations would arise on the part of 
mortgage investors to provide information to the Registry concerning loan 
modifications, assumptions, and substitutions of parties, and concerning limi-
tations on the modification powers of investors.  Civil liability would attach 
for failure to provide this information, and both criminal and civil penalties 
would arise for providing knowingly false or fraudulent information or 
documents.  Finally, the Draft Statute would preempt contrary state law to the 
extent necessary to ensure that the Registry’s determinations identifying loan 
holders and servicers are accepted for state law purposes. 
Ultimately, then, the purpose of the Registry and the legislation creating 
is to facilitate commerce, and to impose such regulations as are necessary to 
achieve this purpose.  There can scarcely be any doubt about the “interstate” 
nature of the enterprise; while not every secondary market sale of a mortgage 
is across state lines, it is obvious that the vast majority are, and that the sec-
ondary mortgage market is one of “those activities that substantially affect 
interstate commerce.”260  Perhaps the most analogous U.S. Supreme Court 
case is Reno v. Condon,261 upholding the constitutionality, under the Com-
merce Clause, of the federal Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 (the 
DPPA), which restricts the states’ ability to sell or share personal information 
from their automobile driver data bases without the driver’s consent. 
The majority opinion of Mr. Justice Rehnquist noted that, 
[T]he DPPA does not require the States in their sovereign capacity 
to regulate their own citizens.  The DPPA regulates the States as 
the owners of databases.  It does not require the South Carolina 
Legislature to enact any laws or regulations, and it does not require 
state officials to assist in the enforcement of federal statutes regu-
lating private individuals.262 
The similarities of the draft statute to the DPPA are obvious.  Like the 
DPPA, the Draft Statute deals with an information database; if drivers’ li-
cense information is an article in commerce, as the Court found, surely mort-
gage holding information is as well.  The Draft Statute would initiate a nar-
row federal preemption of state law to accomplish a valid federal objective.  
It would impose no burdens at all on the states to spend money, enact regula-
tions, or assist in the enforcement of the federal statute.  Indeed, it would not 
  
 260. This is the standard under current Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  See 
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995); see generally Grant S. Nelson, 
A Commerce Clause Standard for the New Millennium: “Yes” to Broad Congres-
sional Control over Commercial Transactions; “No” to Federal Legislation on Social 
and Cultural Issues, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1213, 1248 (2003). 
 261. 528 U.S. 141 (2000). 
 262. Id. at 151. 
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order the states to take any action at all.263  Thus, it seems well within the 
boundaries of federalism that the U.S. Supreme Court has defined. 
Now let us turn to the Due Process issue.  It is highly desirable that ex-
isting mortgages be registerable under the legislation proposed here; other-
wise, a great deal more time will be required for the Registry to become truly 
useful.  In a sense, then, the legislation would apply retroactively to preexist-
ing contracts.  Because registration would be optional with mortgage holders, 
they could hardly complain that their rights are being modified.  From the 
borrower’s viewpoint, however, registration by the mortgage holder would 
work one significant change.  The borrower must now employ a different 
procedure to determine the identity of the holder and servicer of his or her 
mortgage.  The procedure may well be easier, more convenient, and more 
accurate, but it is different.  Nothing else would change: the mortgage obliga-
tion and the methods for foreclosing, modifying, or discharging the mortgage 
would be the same as before, still governed by the same state law. 
Does this change create a Due Process issue?  Surely the answer is no.  
As the Supreme Court noted in 1984,  
Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is supported 
by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means, 
judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the 
exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches. . . . 
[R]etroactive legislation does have to meet a burden not faced by 
legislation that has only future effects. . . .  But that burden is met 
simply by showing that the retroactive application of the legislation 
is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose.264 
Here, the legislative purpose behind retroactive application of the law 
would be to bring to quicker fruition the benefits – transparency, ease of 
transfer, and certainty of rights – which the new Registry would provide.  
Surely this is enough to justify the registration of preexisting mortgages. 
A useful point of reference is provided by Congress’ enactment of the 
Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act of 1991.265  This legislation, applica-
ble to mortgages held by the federal government on apartment projects, pro-
vided an alternative method of foreclosure that was quicker and cheaper than 
  
 263. This fact distinguishes the Draft Statute from New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144 (1992), in which the Court struck down a federal statute mandating that the 
states either regulate the storage and disposal of radioactive waste, or alternatively, 
take possession and title to the waste.  Likewise, the Draft Statute is distinct from 
Printz v. United States. See 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (involving a Congressional enact-
ment that imposed on state law enforcement officials a duty to make background 
checks on firearms purchasers). 
 264. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729-30 
(1984). 
 265. 12 U.S.C. § 3701 (2006). 
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that available under state law in many jurisdictions.  Because it completely 
supplanted state foreclosure proceedings, it was a far greater modification of 
borrower’s rights and expectations than the national mortgage Registry pro-
posed here.  Moreover, it was available to the government retroactively in the 
sense that preexisting mortgages could be foreclosed under the new proce-
dure. 
In sustaining the foreclosure act against a Due Process challenge, the 
Federal District Court noted, 
Congressional legislation “adjusting the burdens and benefits of 
economic life” is presumed constitutional, and the burden is on the 
complaining party to establish that the legislation is arbitrary and 
irrational.  This applies to the retroactive application of a statute as 
well as long as it is “supported by a legitimate legislative purpose 
furthered by a rational means.”  This is so even if the legislature’s 
readjusting of rights and burdens “upsets otherwise settled expecta-
tions.”266 
Compared to the Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act, the changes in 
borrowers’ rights that would result from adoption of the federal Registry leg-
islation described in this paper would be minimal.  If anything, the changes 
would be beneficial to borrowers; anyone with internet access could now 
obtain full and immediate information about any loan.  There would be a 
minor procedural modification, but no added burden.  Finding a Due Process 
violation seems inconceivable on these facts.  
In sum, the national Registry proposal made here will raise no serious 
constitutional issues under either the Commerce Clause or the Due Process 
clause.  Congress has a long history of legislating in the mortgage market, 
and many of the existing statutes have a much stronger impact on the rights of 
borrowers and lenders than the Registry concept.267 
  
 266. Lisbon Square v. United States, 856 F. Supp. 482, 490 (E.D. Wis. 1994) 
(internal citations omitted).  See the excellent discussion in Grant S. Nelson, Con-
fronting the Mortgage Meltdown: A Brief for the Federalization of State Mortgage 
Foreclosure Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 583, 629-30 (2010). 
 267. Illustrations include the Garn-St.Germain Depository Institutions Act of 
1982, § 341 (preempting state law governing the enforcement of due-on-sale clauses); 
The Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C.A. § 3801 (per-
mitting state-chartered financial institutions to make alternative mortgage loans under 
the same regulations governing federally-chartered institutions); and the Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, §§ 308, 324, 12 
U.S.C.A. § 1735f-7 (preempting state usury ceilings). 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
A national mortgage loan Registry structured along the lines outlined 
here would resolve all of the major legal problems that beset the secondary 
mortgage market today.  To be specific, the following problems would be put 
to rest. 
1.  The lack of clarity in the distinction between negotiable and nonne-
gotiable notes that exists today would become irrelevant for purposes of loan 
transfer.  Negotiable and nonnegotiable notes would be treated exactly alike 
and would be transferred in the same manner. 
2.  The need to physically deliver original notes in order to transfer the 
right of enforcement – an extremely burdensome and inconvenient require-
ment for negotiable notes in today’s market – would be eliminated.  Transfers 
would take place electronically with assurance that they would be recognized 
by local law in all jurisdictions. 
3.  The necessity of recording mortgage assignments in local recording 
offices would be eliminated.  MERS was designed to remove the need for 
such assignments (except at the point when foreclosure was necessary), but 
the national Registry would accomplish this without the artificiality and con-
fusion engendered by MERS’ “nominee” status. 
4.  Borrowers would be protected against competing claims by pur-
ported mortgage holders because the Registry’s records of loan holdings 
would be conclusive.  Whether in cases of loan modification, payoff and dis-
charge, approval of a short sale, or foreclosure, a borrower would know with 
certainty whether a purported holder’s claim to the loan was authentic, and 
whether its purported servicer was authorized to act. 
5.  All foreclosures, both judicial and non-judicial, could be conducted 
with assurance that the correct party was foreclosing.  The Registry’s certifi-
cate could be recorded under state law and become a part of the chain of title 
of property passing through foreclosure,268 thus permitting future title exam-
iners to verify that the foreclosure was conducted by the person authorized to 
do so.  Concerns of title insurers about the validity of titles coming through 
foreclosure, currently a major worry,269 would be largely eliminated. 
6.  The current confusion and litigation about separation of notes from 
their mortgages, and about what proof is needed to foreclose a mortgage, 
would be brought to an end.  The Registry’s certificate would provide all of 
the documentary evidence necessary to foreclose. 
  
 268. Draft Statute § 112(b). 
 269. See, e.g., Ron Lieber, After Foreclosure, a Focus on Title Insurance, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 8, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/09/your-money/mortgages 
/09money.html?pagewanted=all; Stephanie Armour, Lack of Title Insurance Could 
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7.  The holder in due course doctrine, with its potential for unfair harm 
to borrowers, would probably disappear in the context of mortgage loans as 
secondary market participants abandoned the practice of physical delivery of 
mortgage notes. 
The system for transferring mortgage loans with which we are saddled 
today is a shambles.  The result has been enormous uncertainty and likely 
huge financial loss for investors, servicers, and title insurers.  It is time for 
Congress to act to create a sensible, simple, and efficient alternative.  
 
APPENDIX: DRAFT STATUTE 
National Mortgage Loan Registry Act 
An Act to provide for the establishment of a National Mortgage Loan 
Registry and to grant legal powers and duties to such Registry. 
 
Preamble. 
The Congress hereby finds that the existing systems for establishing, 
maintaining, and updating records of the holders of mortgage debt in the 
United States are cumbersome, inefficient, and often uninformative to bor-
rowers.  Confusion arising from this system has impaired the functioning of 
foreclosure proceedings and has made mortgage modifications more difficult 
to accomplish.  It is therefore desirable to establish a single, unified national 
system of records of the holders of mortgage debt. 
 
Section 101.  Registry established. 
There is established in the [Name of agency], a bureau to be known as 
the ‘‘National Mortgage Loan Registry,” which shall accept and maintain 
records of the holders of debt secured by real property, and of information 
relating to such debt. 
 
Section 102.  Definitions 
For purposes of this Title the following definitions shall apply: 
(1) BORROWER. – The term “borrower” means the person or persons 
making or guaranteeing a note or granting a mortgage on real property, and 
any successor owners of the real property while the mortgage continues to 
encumber it. 
(2) FEDERALLY RELATED MORTGAGE LOAN. – The term “feder-
ally related mortgage loan” shall have the meaning given in 12 U.S.C. section 
2602(1). 
(3) HOLDER. – The term “holder” means a person or legal entity that is 
entitled to enforce a note and the mortgage which secures the note, and in the 
case of a transferrable electronic record, means the person having control of 
the record. 
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(4) LOAN. – The term “loan” means the combination of a note and 
mortgage, as registered with the Registry in the name of the holder.  The note 
and mortgage comprising a loan registered with the Registry may not be sepa-
rated from one another. 
(5) MORTGAGE. – The term “mortgage” means any instrument creat-
ing an interest in real property to secure performance of an obligation, includ-
ing without limitation a mortgage, deed of trust, or security deed. 
(6) NOTE. – The term “note” means any instrument creating an obliga-
tion to pay money, or reducible to monetary terms, and secured by a mort-
gage.  It includes without limitation a promissory note, bond, or contract, and 
a transferrable electronic record that complies with 15 U.S.C. section7021 or 
equivalent state law. 
(7) REGISTRY. – The term “Registry” means the National Mortgage 
Loan Registry, as created by this Title. 
(8) SERVICER. – The term “servicer” means a person or entity that is 
authorized to provide some or all of the following services for the holder of a 
loan: maintenance of borrower payment records, remittance of borrower 
payments to the holder, maintenance of accounts for payment of taxes and 
insurance, collection of delinquent payments, modification of loan terms, 
approval of transfers of the real property subject to the mortgage, or foreclo-
sure. 
 
Section 103.  Acceptance, transfer, and termination of registrations. 
(a) The Registry is authorized to accept registrations of loans from hold-
ers.  No loan may be registered unless its mortgage has first been recorded or 
registered under state law to establish the priority of the mortgage.  Registra-
tions may be accepted on paper or electronically.  Transmittal of the note to 
the Registry is not necessary to register a loan. 
(b) The holder of a loan that is registered with the Registry may transfer 
the loan to a new holder on the records of the Registry by submitting an ap-
plication to transfer. 
(c) The holder of a loan that is registered with the Registry may termi-
nate the loan’s registration by submitting an application to terminate registra-
tion. 
(d) The Registry shall establish standards for loans accepted for registra-
tion and for applications to transfer and terminate registration.  Such stan-
dards shall require adequate information security protection to ensure that 
electronic documents are accurate, authentic, adequately preserved, and resis-
tant to tampering, and that applications to transfer and terminate registrations 
are authentic requests of the holder of the loan.  All initial registrations, ap-
plications to transfer, and applications to terminate registration shall comply 
with the rules and procedures established by the Registry.  Such rules and 
procedures shall be designed to facilitate efficient bulk registrations, trans-
fers, and terminations of multiple loans. 
(e) The Registry may enter into contracts with “trusted submitters” re-
quiring them to employ specific security procedures, and thereafter permitting 
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them to submit applications and subsequent documents to the Registry under 
rules less burdensome than are required of other submitters. 
(f) The holder of a federally related mortgage loan shall not make a 
transfer of the loan to another holder or designate a servicer for the loan ex-
cept by registration or transfer in the Registry. 
(g) If the holder of a loan holds it as a trustee, a nominee, or in any other 
fiduciary or representative capacity, the name or description of the specific 
trust or other relationship shall be stated as part of the holder’s identity in the 
records of the Registry.  If such a holder is restricted by its governing docu-
ments from modifying a loan, a copy of the relevant restrictions shall be sub-
mitted to the Registry within ten days after the registration of the transfer to 
that holder. 
 
Section 104.  Outright and security transfers. 
An application to transfer a loan on the records of the Registry may re-
quest either an outright transfer or a transfer for security or collateral pur-
poses.  The application, and the records of the Registry, shall clearly desig-
nate which form of transfer is intended.  If the transfer is for security pur-
poses, the application and the records of the Registry shall include a brief 
description of the obligation for which the transfer serves as security, and 
shall state whether the transferor or the transferee is authorized to exercise the 
rights listed in Section 109.  The designation of a transfer as outright or for 
security purposes shall constitute evidence of the intent of the person making 
the registration, but shall not conclusively establish the purpose of the trans-
fer. 
 
Section 105.  Notification of borrowers. 
Each loan registration accepted by the Registry shall include a street ad-
dress and an electronic mail address of each borrower, if available.  The Reg-
istry shall also accept, and include in its record of each loan, the names, street 
addresses, and electronic mail addresses of any additional borrowers who 
submit such information to the Registry from time to time.  When any loan is 
transferred or terminated on the records of the Registry, or when any servicer 
of the loan is added or terminated, the Registry shall send notification of the 
change to all persons shown on its records as borrowers with respect to that 
loan by electronic mail or, if no electronic mail address is available, by US 
Postal Service mail. 
 
Section 106.  Records of servicers. 
(a) A current loan holder that designates one or more servicers to repre-
sent the holder in relationships with the borrower of a loan shall register with 
the Registry the identity of such servicers.  With any such registration of a 
servicer, the holder shall describe, in summary form, the activities in which 
the servicer is authorized to engage on behalf of the holder. 
(b) A current loan holder may, from time to time, terminate the authority 
of any previously designated servicer of the loan. 
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(c) No purported servicer of a registered loan shall have any authority to 
represent the holder in dealing with the borrower unless the servicer’s identity 
and authority have been registered as provided in this section. 
 
Section 107.  Loan information. 
(a) Each loan registered with the Registry shall be accompanied by cop-
ies of the note and the mortgage, together with copies of any mortgage as-
signments, note endorsements or allonges, and modification, substitution, or 
assumption agreements executed prior to registration of the loan with the 
Registry, if the registrant is a party to or possesses a copy of such documents. 
(b) If the loan is modified, a party is substituted, or the loan is assumed 
by a new borrower after registration with the Registry, the loan holder shall 
transmit copies of the applicable documents to the Registry within ten days 
after completion of the modification, substitution, or assumption. 
(c) At the option of the registrant, a loan may also be accompanied by 
copies of or information about other documents related to or associated with 
the loan, including but not limited to loan applications, appraisals, credit re-
ports, closing statements, title insurance policies, and hazard insurance poli-
cies.  
(d) Copies of all documents referred to in this section may be transmit-
ted electronically, and all copies shall be maintained by the Registry in a loan 
file associated with the loan to which they relate. 
 
Section 108.  Access to Registry information. 
(a) The Registry, shall issue, upon request, a certificate applicable to any 
registered loan, stating the identity of the loan holder and the identity of any 
servicers, and describing the authority of such servicers as stated by the loan 
holder in the records of the Registry.  Any person may request such a certifi-
cate with respect to any loan.  If the person so requests, the certificate shall be 
accompanied by: 
(1) a statement of the identities of any successive holders that have held 
the loan since the time of its original registration in the Registry and prior to 
the present holder; and/or 
(2) electronic copies of the mortgage and any mortgage assignments or 
modification, substitution, or assumption agreements held by the Registry 
relating to the loan. 
(b) Copies of other documents in the loan file shall be made available by 
the Registry only to the current loan holder, any servicer of the loan, and the 
borrower, and to any court under subpoena or court order. 
(c) Additional documents relating to a loan may be placed in the loan 
file, as provided in Section 107, only by the current loan holder, any servicer 
of the loan, and the borrower. 
(d) The Registry shall certify that any copy of a document provided by 
the Registry to any person or court is an accurate and authentic copy of the 
document as originally submitted to the Registry. 
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Section 109.  Rights of loan holder and servicer. 
Only the current loan holder or any authorized servicer of the loan act-
ing within the scope of its authority, as shown on the records of the Registry, 
may take the following actions with respect to a registered loan: 
(a) foreclose the mortgage; 
(b) pursue an action for recovery of any amount owing on the note; 
(c) pursue an action for recovery of damages for breach of a covenant in 
the note or the mortgage; 
(d) enter into a modification agreement with the borrower; 
(e) release or discharge the note or the mortgage, whether for the bal-
ance due or for a lesser amount; 
(f) approve or consent to the transfer of the mortgaged real property; 
 
Section 110.  Conclusiveness of Registry’s certificates. 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c), a certificate issued by the Reg-
istry shall be conclusively be deemed correct with respect to: 
(1) its statement of the identity of loan holder and any servicers; 
(2) its statement that the authority of any servicers is as stated by the 
loan holder registering such servicers; 
(3) its representation that the content of any document provided with the 
certificate is an accurate and authentic copy of the document as originally 
submitted to the Registry. 
(b) A certificate issued by the Registry shall not guarantee the authentic-
ity of any documents executed prior to registration of the loan. 
(c) Any person who suffers actual damage as a consequence of depriva-
tion of legal rights due to an error made by the Registry may maintain an 
action in Federal District Court for recovery of such damages. 
(d) If a certificate is issued by the Registry erroneously, the Registry 
may revoke the certificate by notice to the person to whom it was furnished if 
no person has relied upon it in good faith to his detriment. 
 
Section 111.  Fees and charges. 
The Registry may establish and collect fees and charges for initial regis-
tration of loans, acceptance of additional documents into loan files, termina-
tions of registrations and servicer authority, and issuance of certificates.  Fees 
and charges shall be established, and may be modified from time to time, so 
as to produce revenue that will approximate the Registry’s expenses of opera-
tion, taking into account the need to provide reserve funds for the payment of 
damages as provided by Section 110(b). 
 
Section 112.  Preemption of State law. 
(a) A certificate of loan holder identity, issued under Section 108, shall 
be conclusive proof under the law of all States that – 
(1) the identified loan holder is the original mortgagee or recorded as-
signee of the mortgage, is entitled to enforce the note and the mortgage in any 
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proceeding, judicial or non-judicial, and to engage in any other action author-
ized under Section 109; and 
(2) the identified servicer, if any, is entitled to act on behalf of the loan 
holder in any proceeding, judicial or non-judicial, and any other action 
authorized under Section 109 that is within the scope of the authority granted 
to the servicer as stated in the certificate. 
(b) A certificate issued by the Registry under Section 108 shall be enti-
tled to be recorded or registered in the real property records under the laws of 
any State or subdivision of a State. 
(c) all persons acquiring an interest in a registered mortgage loan or the 
mortgaged real property, and all persons instituting a judicial, administrative, 
or non-judicial proceeding affecting a registered mortgage loan or the mort-
gaged real property, are deemed to have notice of the information in a certifi-
cate that would be issued by the Registry under Section 108 as of the earlier 
of: 
(1) the time of acquisition of such interest or the time such proceeding is 
instituted; or 
(2) in the case of a proceeding, the date on which the person instituting 
the proceeding must notify holders of subordinate interests in order to bind 
them to the proceeding. 
(d) Any contrary State constitution, law, or regulation is preempted to 
the extent necessary to establish the entitlements described in this Act. 
 
Section 113.  Criminal and civil penalties. 
(a) Any person who shall knowingly submit to the Registry any false, 
forged, or fraudulent document or information: 
(1) shall be fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned for not more 
than one year, or both, for each violation; and 
(2) shall be held civilly liable for any loss or damage caused to the Reg-
istry or any person by such document or information, and for the Registry’s 
attorneys fees and costs in any civil action in which the Registry shall prevail. 
(b) Any person who shall knowingly fail to submit to the Registry any 
document required to be submitted by Section 103(g) or Section 107(a) or (b) 
shall be held civilly liable for any loss or damage caused to the Registry or 
any person on account of failure to submit such document or information, and 
for the Registry’s attorneys fees and costs in any civil action in which the 
Registry shall prevail. 
(c) Any person who engages in a pattern or practice of violation of sub-
sections (a) or (b) of this section may be barred by the Registry from the right 
to register additional mortgage loans.  Such debarment may be for a limited 
time or may be permanent.  Debarment may be ordered by the Registry only 
upon a finding of such pattern or practice in a hearing comporting with the 
federal Administrative Procedure Act. 
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